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LEADING ARTICLE
VARIATIONS ON THE THEME OF DOMBROWSKI v.
PFISTER: FEDERAL INTERVENTION IN STATE
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS AFFECTING
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
MARC STICKGOLD*

One of the most rapidly changing and complex areas of the
law revolves around the propriety and wisdom of federal
court ((interference" with state court proceedings involving first amendment rights. Mr. Stickgold examines the
doctrine being evolved in this area, centering the discussion around Dombrowski v. Pfister and cases that have followed it. The author reports that several courts have not
followed the Dombrowski mandates, and consequently,
fundamental first amendment freedoms are not adequately
protected.
The purpose of this article is to examine the implementation and
development of a Supreme Court mandate to the United States
district courts. The time span between the pronouncement of a
mandate and its understanding and correct implementation by the
lower courts is often great. In Dombrowski v. Pfister,1 the Supreme Court ordered that lower federal courts immediately consider two attacks on state criminal prosecutions affecting speech activities: those where it is alleged that the prosecution is under a
statute vague and overbroad on its face, and those where it is alleged that protected speech activities are the basis of a prosecution
in bad faith, for the purpose of discouraging and intimidating persons in the exercise of first amendment rights.2 The Court further
,. Assistant Dean, University of Wisconsin Law School. B.A., 1960,
University of Illinois; J.D., 1963, Northwestern University.
1 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
2 Id. at 489-92. Although I am confident that Dombrowski issued' the
mandate indicated, there is still some lingering doubt as to whether both
attacks are necessary to state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983(1964), or whether the mandate governs when either attack is
present. Dombrowski clearly considered the two attacks separately. Justices Black, Stewart, and Harlan, however, dissenting in Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965), indicate that both evils must be present. See text
accompanying notes 113-57 infra. Commentators on the subject have almost uniformly accepted the "two prong" theory of Dombrowski. See
Bailey, Enjoining State Criminal Prosecutions which Abridge First Amendment Freedoms, 3 HARv. CIV. Lm.-CIV. RIGHTS L. REV. 67, 85-86 n.59 (1967);
Boyer, Federal Injunctive Relief: A Counterpoise Against the Use of State
Criminal Prosecutions Designed to Deter the Exercise of Preferred Constitutional Rights, 13 How. L.J. 51, 84 (1967); Brewer, Dombrowski v. Pfister:
Federal Injunctions Against State Prosecutions In Civil Rights Cases-A
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ordered that either declaratory or injunctive relief, or both, be
granted if either of these evils is established. 3 In Cameron v.
Johnson 4 and Zwickler v. Koota,5 the Court has further refined the
intricacies of some of the issues raised in Dombrowski by again
ordering lower federal courts not to abstain from deciding whether
declaratory or injunctive relief is appropriate when substantial
first amendment issues are raised. 6
This article will explore the contours of the issues and pronouncements in Dombrowski;7 examine how the mandate has been
implemented and developed in cases subsequent to Dombrowski;
and discuss the presumptions and perspectives which should guide
courts in this area.
I. THE THEME: DOMBROWSKI V. PFISTER
Early in October 1963, James Dombrowski, Director of the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF), along with Benjamin
Smith, its treasurer, and Bruce Waltzer, its attorney, were arrested
by state and local police on warrants charging violation of the
Louisiana Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law and
the Communist Propaganda Control Law. s Search warrants were
issued, and the homes and offices of these men were searched. o
SCEF had been engaged in civil rights activity in various Southern
states since the late thirties. Its purpose was "to help secure to
Negro citizens the rights guaranteed to them under the United
States Constitution and to end all forms of racial segregation and
discrimination in the interest of Negro and white citizens of the
Southern States."10
New Trend in Federal-State JUdicial Relations, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 71, 80
(1965); The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 150, 173 (1965);
Note, The Dombrowski Remedy-Federal Injunctions Against State Court
Proceedings Violative of Constitutional Rights, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 92, 96

(1966); 1966 DUKE L.J. 219; 21 RUTGERS L. HEV. 679, 681, 691 (1967); 3 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 76, 83 (1966); 32 TENN. L. REV. 641, 642 (1965). See also
Comment, Theories of Federalism and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1033
(1966), and 27 U. PITT. L. REV. 145 (1965), which recognize, but criticize,
the "two prong" theory.
3 380 U.S. at 492, 497-98.
4 381 U.S. 741 (1965).
5 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
6 Federal courts have exercised the power to enJOIn state criminal
prosecutions affecting speech activities for other reasons. See McSure1y v.
Ratliff, Civil No. 1146 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 14, 1967); Hulett v. Julian, 250 F.
Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966).
7 This article will not deal with federal intervention in state criminal
proceedings dealing with nonspeech activities.
S Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 14:358-:374 (Supp. 1968); Communist Propaganda Control Law,
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 14: 390-: 390.8 (Supp. 1962).
9 See Judge Wisdom's dissent for a description of the search.
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 573 (E.D. La. 1964).
10 See Complaint, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La.
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The arrest warrants were quashed by a Louisiana parish judge
because there was no probable cause for their issuance. The
seized evidence was suppressed on the ground that the raids were
illegal. "Louisiana officials continued, however, to threaten prosecution . . . ."ll Shortly thereafter, a Louisiana grand jury was
convened to consider evidence against SCEF and its officials. On
November 12,1963, Dombrowski and SCEF filed a suit in the United
States district court for declaratory and injunctive relief.
The federal suit alleged that the actions taken by state and
local officials were for the illegal purpose of deterring SCEF's civil
rights activities and destroying its capacity to function. It further
alleged that the statutory sections under which the criminal prosecutions had been brought were unconstitutional on their face and
as applied. It supported the suit with offers of proof and affidavits
dealing with the legitimacy of the conduct of SCEF and the other
plaintiffs, the nature of the official action directed against them
by James Pfister and others, and the announced purpose of such
official action. 12
Judge Wisdom issued a temporary restraining order against further prosecution pending the decision of the three judge court
which had been convened to consider the constitutional attack on
the statutes. The three judge court dismissed the suit for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and dissolved
the temporary restraining order.ls Judge Wisdom dissented. 14
The district court held that the substantial nature of the constitutional issues raised did not, in itself, justify interference in the
state proceeding, particularly where the state's right of self-preservation, "the last vestige of the dignity of sovereignty," was at
issue. 15 It indicated that although interference with state proceedings has been allowed "under exceptional circumstances," no such
1964). It is interesting to note that both Smith and Waltzer were arrested
while attending the first interracial lawyers conference held in New Orleans in the 20th century. See Brewer, supra note 2, at 75.
.
11 380 U.S. at 488. The seized books and records found their way into
the hands of Chairman Pfister of the Louisiana Joint Legislative Commission on Un-American Activities, and on November 8, 1963, SCEF was
named in a committee resolution as a "Communist front organization."
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, App. A, para. 14 (E.D. La. 1964).
12 See Complaint, Intervening Complaint, Offers of Proof, and Affadavits,
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964). Portions of the
complaint are reproduced in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 564
(E.D. La. 1964).
13 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964). The three
judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284 (1964).
14 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 569 (E.D. La. 1964). Judge
Wisdom feels abstention was totally inappropriate; would find certain sections of the law unconstitutional on their face; would require a hearing on
the allegations of "bad faith" application of the laws; and would issue
injunctive relief if the allegations are proven.
15 Id. at 559.
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circumstances existed here. It looked to the importance of the
state's interest, and found that "[n] one of the cases [where interference was sanctioned] involved so fundamental an element of
state sovereignty as that of self-preservation."16
The court determined that federal legislation and case law did
not supercede the right of a state to prosecute for sedition against
the state itself, and that since the state could constitutionally proceed, the resolution of plaintiffs' constitutional challenges should
be in the state criminal proceedings. Likewise, the court refused
an evidentiary hearing on the unconstitutional application of the
statutes (although recognizing that such "evidence has been frequently admitted") since "here the very vitals of our constitutional system of government are on the line."17 According to the
court, the preservation of the integrity of the state criminal process,
the avoidance of undue conflict between the sovereigns, and a possible saving interpretation of the statutes by the state courts all
dictated abstention. 1s
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction19 in order to
resolve a "seeming conflict" between the district court decision in
Dombrowski and the later Supreme Court decision in Baggett v.
Bullitt,20 "and to settle important questions concerning federal in16 Id. at 560 n.1.
The district court cites and attempts to distinguish
eight cases in which interference was allowed.
17 Id. at 564.
See Gibson v. Florida, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Louisiana ex. reI. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366
U.S. 293 (1961); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
18 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 559-64 (E.D. La. 1964).
19 377 U.S. 976 (1964).
20 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Baggett was decided by the Supreme Court on
June 1, 1964, whereas the Louisiana district court decided Dombrowski on
February 20, 1964. The history of Baggett can be followed in Nostrand v.
Balmer, 53 Wash. 2d 460, 335 P.2d 10 (1959), vacated and remanded sub
nom., Nostrand v. Little, 362 U.S. 474 (1960); Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wash.
2d 111, 361 P.2d 551 (1961), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 436 (1962); Baggett
v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1963).
In Baggett, 64 members of the faculty, staff, and student body of the
University of Washington brought a class action to have certain 1931 and
1955 Washington statutes that required the execution of two different
loyalty oaths as a condition of employment declared unconstitutional, and
for an injunction against the enforcement of these statutes against some of
the plaintiffs. The three judge court held the 1955 oath constitutional. It
also held that, although there were sUbstantial constitutional questions as
to the validity of the 1931 oath, it would abstain in favor of state court
adjudication. The Supreme Court held abstention inappropriate, and then
examined the two oaths and found them both vague and overbroad.
The state labels as wholly fanciful the suggested possible coverage
of the two oaths. It may well be correct, but the contention only
emphasizes the difficulties with the two statutes; for if the oaths do
not reach some or any of the behavior suggested, what specific conduct do the oaths cover? Where does fanciful possibility end and
intended coverage begin?
It will not do to say that a prosecutor's sense of fairness and the
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junctions against state criminal prosecutions threatening constitutionally protected expression."21 The Court may have unsettled
more questions than it settled, but it addressed itself to the following significant points. First, what kinds of challenges to state
criminal prosecutions threatening constitutionally protected expression will establish irreparable harm sufficient to state a federal equitable claim? Second, when is it appropriate to avoid
decision on these challenges and abstain in favor of state court
adjudication of the issues?
II.

THE SETTLED ISSUES-THE UNSETTLED ISSUES

A.

Irreparable Harm

The Court began by restating the rule that "it is generally to be
assumed that state courts and prosecutors will observe constitutional limitations as expounded by this Court, and that the mere
possibility of erroneous initial application of constitutional standards will usually not amount to the irreparable injury necessary
to justify a disruption of orderly state proceedings."22 The injury
"normally incident" to a criminal proceeding "brought lawfully
and in good faith"23 is insufficient to "warrant cutting short the
normal adjudication of constitutional issues in the course of a
criminal prosecution."24
The first question in Dombrowski, therefore, narrowed to whether
the two evils alleged 25 involved merely the "erroneous initial application of constitutional standards" incident to an "otherwise good
faith criminal prosecution" or "irreparableinjury."26 The Supreme Court found that these allegations by plaintiffs
Constitution would prevent a successful perjury prosecution for some
of the activities seemingly embraced within the sweeping statutory
definitions. The hazard of being prosecuted for knowing but guiltless behavior remains. . .. Well-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law. Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
.
21 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
22 Id. at 484-85 (emphasis added). See Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319
U.S. 157 (1943).
23 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
24 Id.
See Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941) (mere
threat of a single prosecution); Spielman Motor Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295
U.S. 89 (1935) (same); Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941) (no irreparable
injury or constitutional infirmity in statute); Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S.
240 (1926) (same).
25 Originally, James A. Dombrowski, Executive Director of the Southern
Conference Educational Fund, Inc., and the SCEF were the plaintiffs. Subsequently, a motion to intervene as plaintiffs was granted on behalf of
Benjamin E. Smith, Treasurer of SCEF, and Bruce C. Waltzer, "a friend
and supporter" of SCEF and an attorney active in civil rights. All four
parties are referred to as plaintiffs. Plaintiffs actually alleged more than
two evils, but the other allegations were either dropped on appeal or assimilated into the two main points.
26 380 U.S. at 484-85.
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depict a situation in which the defense of the State's criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of
constitutional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss
or impairment of freedom of expression will occur if appellants must await the state court's disposition and ultimate review in this Court of any adverse determination.
These allegations, if true, clearly show irreparable injury.27
We shall examine the reasons why the harm caused by these
two evils is severe enough to justify early intervention in state
processes. 28
1.

MISUSE OF A STATUTE

The complaint in Dombrowski alleged that the threat to enforce
the statute against the plaintiffs was made not with an "expectation of securing valid convictions," but rather as part of a plan to
"harass appellants and discourage them and their supporters from
asserting and attempting to vindicate the constitutional rights of
Negro citizens of Louisiana."2o Since the district court denied an
evidentiary hearing on these allegations,30 the issue before the Supreme Court was not whether a "bad faith prosecution" had, in
fact, been established, but whether sufficient allegations of bad
faith were stated under section 1983 (the Civil Rights Act) 31 to
require the district court to adjudicate the issues and fashion appropriate relief should plaintiffs prevail,32 The lower court's dismissal was reversed. The Supreme Court said:
[AJ ppellants have attacked the good faith of the appellees
in enforcing the statutes, claiming that they have invoked,
and threaten to continue to invoke, criminal process without any hope of ultimate success, but only to discourage
appellants' civil rights activities. . .. [TJhese allegations
state a claim under the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. 33
The phrase "without any hope of ultimate success" is important
in understanding the Court's reasoning. It is not infrequent that a
prosecutor can count on the local judge or jury to convict political dissenters or others holding unpopular views, regardless of the
Id. at 485-86.
See the caveat in note 2 supra.
380 U.S. at 482. The complaint was supported by affadavits and offers of proof. See note 10 supra.
30 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 563 (E.D. La. 1964).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
32 The Supreme Court remanded the case for a hearing by the district
court on the "bad faith" attack. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 49798 (1965). The hearing has not been held, and a temporary restraining
order issued pending the hearing is still in effect. See 21 RUTGERS L. REV.,
supra note 2, at 95 n.22.
33 380 U.S. at 490 (emphasis added).
.27

28
29
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facts or law in the case.34 However, the concept of "ultimate
success" includes appeals through the state system and the possibility of certiorari or appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States. It is the "hope of success" at these higher, unbiased levels of
review that must be examined.
The elements necessary to establish a bad faith prosecution have
yet to be articulated. 35 Involving as it does an inquiry into the
state of mind and the intentions of prosecutors and other state
officials, the burden of establishing deliberate intent to suppress
speech activities is almost insurmountable. 36 In most cases, there
are bound to be ambiguities as to the state's purpose in initiating
arrests or prosecutions. 37 The area between those cases where
valid statutes are clearly intentionally misapplied to protected
speech activities, and those where the statute is found to be unconstitutional "as applied," but without proof of intentional misconduct by state officials is wide, and will probably encompass most
cases.
The phrase "bad faith prosecution"38 in the opinion seems to exclude cases where the prosecution is obviously unconstitutional, but
where no direct proof of the prosecutor's intent is available. For
example, it has been suggested that discriminatory enforcement of
34 Lusky, Racial Discrimination and the Federal Law: A Problem in
Nullification, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1163 (1963). After discussing numerous

examples of such local bias, Professor Lusky comments:
It is sometimes forgotten that the principal, if not the only, reason
for establishment of the lower federal courts was the need for dealing with local opposition to, or disregard of, the federal law. Unless
they perform this function adequately, there is little reason to have
them at all. rd. at 1178.
35 For Dombrowski's statement, see text accompanying note 33 supra.
Also see text accompanying notes 36-42 infra. Just how much of a "hint"
of improper purpose must be established is still unsettled. The burden
imposed is presently an extremely onerous one, see note 36 infra,. and it
has been suggested that the burden be revised. See Bailey, supra note 2,
at 102-2l.
36 Two cases where the burden has been overcome are NAACP v.
Thompson, 357 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1966); and Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750
(5th Cir. 1965) (reversing denial of removal), 363 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1966)
(vacated for further consideration in light of City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808 [1966], and Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 [1966]).
The burden has often proved too great. See Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp.
538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga.
1966); Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966); Turner v.
LaBelle, 251 F. Supp. 443 (D. Conn. 1966). See also Bailey, supra note 2,
at 96.
37 To determine the purpose, courts have looked to public announcements
by government officials in newspapers or other news media, statements of
legislators, and the history of the practice attacked and its effect on protected activities.
38 The term is used in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965),
and is apparently meant to distinguish the type of situation present in
Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), where the state was held
to be proceeding in "good faith."
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a valid statute should be sufficient to abort a prosecution in its
inception. s9 And prosecutions under a law phrased in general
terms but passed with the clear intent that it be applied to specific
activities which the court finds to be protected should also support
relief. 40 Conversely, use of a law which has lain dormant and unused for a considerable period might give rise to a presumption
that the prosecution is primarily to suppress the speech activity,
not vindicate some ongoing socially justifiable state policy.41 Each
of these types of state enforcement should legitimately be placed
under the "bad faith" heading. They represent instances where the
attack on the speech activities so overwhelms any possible state
interest in a continuing policy of legitimate concern that a strong
presumption should arise that the "purpose" of the prosecution is
to thwart first amendment rights. 42
39 See Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943), which refers to
the propriety of injunctive relief in a case like Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), where state officials acted in "bad faith" to drive union organizers
out of the area.
40 See Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964), rev'd and
remanded per curiam, 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966), prob. juris. noted,
389 U.S. 809 (1967); Bush v. School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961).
Compare United States v. Miller, 367 F.2d 72 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 911, with O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (1st Cir. 1967).
41 In Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961), the Court held that no justiciable issue was presented where a doctor and his patient sued for a declaration that Connecticut's laws against both giving advice on contraceptives and their use were unconstitutional. The primary basis for the
holding was that no "imminent prosecution" was established. The Court
said:
But even 'were we to read the allegations to convey a clear threat of
imminent prosecutions, we are not bound to accept as true all that
is alleged. . .. The Connecticut law prohibiting the use of contraceptives has been on the State's books since 1879 ... , During the
more than three quarters of a century since its enactment, a prosecution for its violation seems never to have been initiated, except
in one case. See State v. Nelson, 126 Conn. 412, 11 A.2d 856 (1940).
See aLso Turner v. La Belle, 251 F. Supp. 443 (D. Conn. 1966).
42 See Bailey, supra note 2, at 104-06, where the author suggests that a
"preliminary" hearing be held in federal court when a colorable first
amendment claim has been made, to determine whether "state officials,
however sincere, have ... put together sufficient evidence to support constitutionally permissible prosecution." This would include an "inquiry ...
whether the law sought to be enforced could, in light of the first amendment, reasonably and constitutionally be applied to the conduct in which
the petitioners engaged."
Another possible aspect of "bad faith" has been raised with regard
to the searches and seizures in Dombrowski. It was alleged in Dombrowski
v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82 (1967), that state officials had a working relationship with the United States Internal Security Subcommittee, through its
Chairman, Senator Eastland, and its Chief Counsel. A suit was filed, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), alleging an illegal conspiracy to seize
the records, and, requesting damages against Senator Eastland and his
Chief Counsel. The Supreme Court held that although Senator Eastland
was immune from such a suit, his Chief Counsel was not, and recovery of
damages was warranted if the alleged conspiracy with Louisiana officials
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VAGUENESS ATTACK ON STATUTE REGULATING EXPRESSION

Dombrowski also alleged that the statutes under which he was
being prosecuted43 were unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 44
The district court opinion conceded that these allegations raised
serious first amendment issues,45 but held that "the normal adjudication of constitutional defenses in the course of state criminal
prosecutions"46 was sufficient. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the district court's conventional view of irreparable harm too
limited.
A criminal prosecution under a statute regulating expression usually involves imponderables and contingencies that
themselves may inhibit the full exercise of First Amendment freedoms . . . . When the statutes also have an overbroad sweep, as is here alleged, the hazard of loss or substantial impairment of those precious rights may be critical. For in such cases, the statutes lend themselves too
readily to denial of those rights. 47
The Court based its decision, therefore, both on the harm implicit
in the threat posed by the vagueness and overbreadth of the statute itself, and the legitimacy of the existence of a prosecution under
that statute. The Supreme Court reiterated that the assumption that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure
ample vindication of constitutional rights is unfounded when the
statute regulates expression and is attacked as vague and overbroad. 48 "For the threat of sanctions may deter ... almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctionS."40 The point seems
to be that when the existence of the state proceeding is challenged
in federal court as unconstitutional, the plaintiffs cannot be relegated to that proceeding for their hearing. And if the challenge
succeeds, the state proceeding cannot continue.
The Court feels there is "danger of tolerating, in the area of
First Amendment freedoms, the existence of a penal statute susceptible of sweeping and improper application."50 The "chilling
effect" on the exercise of free speech can result, "however expeditious" the state court proceedings. The prosecution itself, "unafwas proven. See Pfister v. Arceneaux, 376 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1966), which
was the suit against the Louisiana officials.
48 See note 8 supra.
44 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556, 565 (E.D. La. 1964).
4~ Id. at 559.
46 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
47 Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
48 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S.
360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); City of Altus v. Carr,
255 F. Supp. 828, 836 (W.D. Tex. 1966); Bush v. School Bd., 194 F. Supp.
182 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd sub nom., Tugwell v. Bush, 367 U.S. 907 (1961).
40 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486, citing NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415 (1963).
50 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963).
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fected by the prospects of its success or failure,"51 may cause impermissible burdens on speech. "Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required
that all of those subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution
to test their rights."52
Criminal prosecution always imposes burdens on the defendant.
These burdens act, and are intended to act, not only to initiate
the criminal process, but to halt the activities in which the
individual was engaged. It can therefore be seen that a different
problem may be posed when these burdens serve to stifle protected speech activities rather than some other activity of less importance in our society.53
These burdens are limitless, but they can be grouped generally.
First, the burdens that arise from the normal criminal process:
arrest,54 bail,55 detention,56 and tria1. 57 A related burden, present
51 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). See Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Gremillion v. United States, 368 U.S. 11 (1961); Bush v. School Bd., 194 F.
Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961).
52 380 U.S. at 486.
53 These other activities mayor may not be illegal. Acquittal is nor.,.
mally considered sufficient protection to vindicate a legitimate activity
which was inappropriately halted by the initiation of criminal procedures.
Speech, as a "preferred freedom," may call not only for quicker and more
certain vindication, but for different remedies to assure these results.
54 The use of arrests to deter civil rights workers is the most obvious
contemporary example. The same is now true of anti-Vietnam War demonstrations. Thousands were arrested during the "freedom rides" and "sit-ins"
in the South, hundreds in Mississippi alone. Professor Lusky discusses the
Mississippi experience. Lusky, supra note 34. More recently, arrest has
been used to break up demonstrations and other activities directed against
the role of the United States in the Vietnam War. In New York City, during December 4-8, 1967, hundreds of demonstrators were arrested and
briefly jailed, only to be released without charge a few hours later, when
the demonstration had ended. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8, 1967, § 1, at 1, col. 4;
id., at 12, col. 1.
55 In Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp. 595 (S.D. Miss. 1961), the total
bail required by the state courts for the freedom riders was $372,000. See
Boyer, supra note 2, at 95. The evils of the present bail system prevalent
in most American jurisdictions have prompted great criticism. See, e.g.,
D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED STATES: 1964-A REPORT TO'l.'HE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 53 (1964), where the
authors conclude that high bail had been employed in civil rights cases
"as punishment or to deter continued demonstrations"; Foote, Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959 (1965); Note, Bail mid Civil
Rights, 2 LAW IN TRANS. Q. 111 (1965); Note, Bail.: The Need for Reconsideration, 59 Nw. U.L.. REV. 678 (1964). See also The Federal Bail Reform
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3152 (1966).
56 High bail, besides effectively draining the financial resources of the
defendant and those who support him, often has a direct effect on subsequent proceedings· in the case. The threat of prolonged pre-conviction
detention in lieu of bail often forces guilty pleas which would not otherwise
be entered. Those who do not plead guilty may spend many weeks or

NUMBER 2]

FmST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

379

in every case, is the extra-legal sanctions, including stigmatization and disruption of personal life, which arise automatically
from the imposition of the first type. 58 The third type of burdenpeculiar to speech cases--is a burden placed upon "all society"59:
others will be deterred from speech activities. The Dombrowski
court expressed concern on this point in indicating why the normal "standing" requirements in a case involving first amendment
freedoms were loosened to take into consideration possible threats
to persons not party to the law suit. "For free expression-of
transcendent value to all society, and not merely to those exercis~
ing their rights-might be the loser."60 Professor Kinoy has remarked of Justice Brennan's opinion: "[T]he Justice was not referring solely to the 'chilling effect' on the individuals who are
caught in the toils of repressive legislation. Not at all. He wrote of
the 'chilling effect' on the exercise of these rights by the entire
nation."61 Unnumbered, unknown people62 may be deterred from
months in jail awaiting trial. Often the pre-conviction detention period
will be longer than the maximum possible sentence for the offense with
which the defendant is charged. Acquittal is of little use if more than
the maximum possible sentence has already been served.
57 See Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960), where although the case did not involve speech activities, the "burdens" of being
forced to trial for legitimate activities is illustrated.
58 See 80 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1496 (1967).
The number, variety, and
seriousness of extra-legal sanctions are limited only by the imagination of
those attempting to impose the sanctions. The most obvious, and frequent,
personal sanctions are loss of employment, or various rights connected with
employment; loss of student status (many of the plaintiffs in Zwicker v.
Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 [W.D. Wis. 1967], see text accompanying notes 175186 infra, have been expelled from the University of Wisconsin on one
pretext or another, although their convictions are on appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, and Zwicker v. Boll is still pending in the United
States Supreme Court); loss of various opportunities for status or improvement in status, such as promotion, pay increases, etc.; social ostracism,
including expulsion from social clubs, or the more informal and insidious
exclusion from social activities in which one was previously invited to
participate; political defeat; economic ruin, as through boycotts, threats; or
loss of good will; harassment to family, in the form of letters, phone calls,
personal insults, or threats; and ridicule and public obloquy, including
unfavorable newspaper and radio-TV coverage.
Organizational activities can likewise be destroyed. Membership and
contributions often cease when public knowledge of association with a
particular organization is likely to produce repercussions against the individuals. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961); Robison, Protection of Associations from Compulsory Disclosure of Membership, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 614 (1958).
.
59 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
60 Id.
61 Kinoy, Brief Remarks on Dombrowski v. Pfister-A New Path in
Constitutional Litigation?, 26 GUILD PRACTITIONER 1, 7 (1967).
62 Dombrowski expands the concept of "irreparable harm" necessary to
justify equitable intervention, and reaffirms the liberalized concept of
"standing" in first amendment cases. One of the. broadest statements on
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exercIsmg their first amendment rights if criminal prosecution,
"however expeditious,"63-and whether ultimate acquittal comes or
not 64-is permitted. Dombrowski declared: "We believe that those
affected by a statute are entitled to be free of the burdens of defending prosecutions, however expeditious, aimed at hammering
out the structure of the statute piecemeal, with no likelihood of
obviating similar uncertainty for others."G5 Those with a scrupulous regard for the proscriptions and limits of the law66 might steer
clear of the areas of protected expression to be certain not to risk
involvement with the criminal process. G7 Fear is a powerful deterrent, and when aimed at first amendment activities, it gives rise to
the "chilling effect"G8 which most bothers the Court. When a prosecution is threatened, therefore, and one or both of the two Dombrowski evils are alleged, a federal claim for equitable relief has
been stated.
B. Abstention and Comity

Even though a claim may be stated under the Civil Rights Act,GO
the courts must still deal with the Siamese twins of "comity"70
standing can be read in Heckler v. Shepard, 243 F. Supp. 841 (D. Idaho
1965), where plaintiffs attacked a state loyalty oath.
It does not appear from the evidence before us, even after hearing
the case on the merits, that any of the plaintiffs have been injured
by the operation of the challenged statute, or that any of them would
actually be injured by its enforcement; nevertheless, in view of controlling precedent, the standing of plaintiffs to have the constitutional issues adjudicated is no longer open to question. Id. at 844.
Numerous commentators on Dombrowski have noted the Court's concern with the effect on third persons of state actions affecting speech activities. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARV. L. REV. 56, 171
(1965); 32 TENN. L. REV. 641, 642 (1965).
63 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
64 Id. at 486.
65 Id. at 491.
66 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 385 (1964); Amsterdam, The Void-forVagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960).
67 Spieser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
68 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). See Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Wolft
v. Selective Servo Local Bd. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967); Bush v.
School Bd., 194 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. La. 1961).
69 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). There are, of course, a number of sections
that the courts refer to as the "Civil Rights Act." Appellants in Dombrowski alleged infringements of id. §§ 1971, 1981, 1983, 1985. It appears,
however, that the Court considered the claim to be stated under id. § 1983.
See Dilworth v. Riner, 343 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1965). References to the Civil
Rights Act in this article will be to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) unless otherwise
noted.
70 See Boyer, supra note 2, at 62; Taylor & Willis, The Power of Federal
Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 YALE L.J. 1169' (1933);
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1930);
Note, Federal Civil Procedure: Anti-Injunction Statute's Application to
Civil Rights Cases, 1965 DUKE L.J. 813; Note, Federal Injunctions Against
State Criminal Proceedings, 4 STAN. L. REV. 381 (1952). See, e.g., England
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and "abstention."7l The doctrine of abstention is a judge fashioned
vehicle 72 whereby a federal court refuses to proceed in a case over
which it clearly has jurisdiction. It is normally invoked to allow a
state court decision on an issue of state law which will avoid or
moot the federal constitutional issue raised,73 or to prevent "unseemly conflict" between the state and federal courts, and thereby
preserve the concept of "comity."74
The modern abstention doctrine originated in Railroad Commission v. PuLLman CO.75 A unanimous court, emphasizing a desire to "avoid the waste of a tentative decision as well as the friction
of a premature constitutional adjudication,"76 refused to exercise
jurisdiction because of a possible interpretation of state law that
would be controlling.77 Pullman reflects, therefore, the two basic
underpinnings of abstention: a desire to avoid premature constitutional decision and a "furthering [of] the harmonious relation
between state and federal authority."78 The Court's main emphasis was, however, on the first point.79
The comity issue is often phrased that the state judicial system
provides procedures whereby the plaintiff's issues can be raised and
resolved;80 that an "unseemly conflict" between state and federal
v. Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964); Government Employees v.
Windsor, 353 U.S. 364 (1957); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45
(1941).
71 See, Federal Judicial Power: The Doctrine of Equitable Abstention,
2 RACE REL. L. REP. 1222 (1957); Boyer, supra note 2, at 76; Wright, The
Abstention Doctrine Reconsidered, 37 TEX. L. REV. 815 (1959); Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1045 (1965); Note,
Judicial Abstention From the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction, 59 COLUM.
L. REV. 749 (1959); Note, Federal Power to Enjoin State Proceedings, 74
HARV. L. REV. 726 (1961); Note, The Abstention Doctrine, 17 VAND. L. REV.
124 (1964). See, e.g., Louisana Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux,
360 U.S. 25 (1959); Compare Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), with
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965), and Ashwander v. TVA, 297
U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (concurring opinion).
n England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964).
73 See note 71 supra.
.
74 See note 70 supra.
75 312 U.S. 496 (1941). For a case decided the same year, implementing
the abstention commands of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), see Toucey v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
76 Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941).
77
78

Id.
Id. at 50l.

70 Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 312 U.S. 45 (1941).
80 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966),

rev'd, 389 U.S.
241 (1967); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. La. 1964). Compare Davis v. Jury Comm'n, 261 F. Supp. 591 (M.D. Ala. 1966), and Kelley
v. Wallace, 257 F. Supp. 343 (M.D. Ala. 1966); with Hulett v. Julian, 250 F.
Supp. 208 (M.D. Ala. 1966); Midwest Video Corp. v. Campbell, 250 F. Supp.
158 (D.C.N.M. 1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (W.D. Wash. 1963),
rev'd 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Contra, McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668
(1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); City of Altus v. Carr, 255 F.
Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966).
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courts would result if jurisdiction was exercised;81 or that the federal court should not interfere in the absence of a showing of bad
faith on the part of the state system. 82 On the issue of enjoining
criminal prosecutions, a broad rule of comity justified abstention
in Douglas v. City of Jeanette. 83
Douglas was a federal suit to restrain threatened criminal prosecution of Jehovahs' Witnesses who were making house to house distribution of books and pamphlets. The prosecution was under a
peddler's licensing ordinance. The suit alleged that the ordinance
"as applied" was an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech,
press, and religion. 84 On the day that the Court decided Douglas,
the ordinance as applied was held unconstitutional on the same
grounds in Murdock v. Pennsylvania,85 which decided a number of
appeals from convictions under the ordinance for conduct substantially identical to that in Douglas.
Douglas held that the complaint clearly stated a claim under the
Civil Rights Act,86 but that equitable relief was "in the discretion
of the court"87 and should be withheld if sought on "slight or inconsequential grounds,"88 particularly where it might "interfere
with or embarrass"89 state proceedings. Since the Court had just
held the ordinance, as applied, unconstitutional, it refused to enjoin
threatened prosecutions. The Court felt that the ruling in Murdock
had, in effect, removed the threat to speech activities. "There is
no allegation here and no proof that respondents would not, nor
can we assume that they will not, acquiesce in the decision of this
Court holding the challenged ordinance unconstitutional as applied
to petitioners."90
. The "hands off" attitude grew mushroomlike out of Douglas, and
it still grows in spite of the specific language in Dombrowski: "We
hold the abstention doctrine is inappropriate for cases such as the
present one where, unlike Douglas v. City of Jeanette, statutes are
justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or
as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities."91
81 Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959).
82 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966).
83

319 U.S. 157 (1943).

84 Id. at 159.
85

319 U.S. 105 (1943).

86 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943).
87 Id.
88

Id.

89 Id. at 163.
90 Id. at 165.
91 380 U.S. at 489. See Boyer, supra note 2, at 78, 81: "In recent years,
the abstention doctrine has been increasingly used by the district courts as
a means of deferring or avoiding the distasteful task of enforcing federal
law opposed by the local community. . . . Douglas continues to be invoked
by those who would restrict or eliminate the role of the federal courts from
aggressive state action."

NUMBER 2]

FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS

383

Dombrowski stands as a basic policy change from Douglas 92 and
other more recent first amendment cases. 93 The Court has realized
that the delay inherent in the abstention doctrine is at the heart of
the "irreparable harm" caused to speech activities. "[W] e have, in
effect, avoided making vindication of freedom of expression await
the outcome of protracted litigation."94 Dombrowski dealt with
plaintiff's allegations separately. Abstention was held inappropriate when a prosecution is attacked as being initiated and conducted to discourage protected activities. 05 In this situation, a constitutional interpretation of a statute by the state court is not
needed because the validity of the statute is unrelated to the nature of the attack on the prosecution. Even if the statute is clearly
constitutional, this "would not alter the impropriety of appellees'
invoking the statute in bad faith to impose continued harassment
in order to discourage appellants' activities."96
It is the nature of the prosecution-including the purpose for
which it is initiated and conducted-not the constitutionality of
the statute under which it is initiated that creates the harm under
this wing of the Dombrowski decision. 07 This is consistent with
dictum in Douglas which indicated that no person is immune from
prosecution in "good faith" for his alleged criminal acts. 98 Justice
Stone in Douglas specifically referred to Hague v. CIO,99 "where
local officials forcibly broke up meetings of the complainants and
in many instances forcibly deported them from the state without
trial,"10o as an instance where equitable relief would be justified
because officials were not acting in good faith. Considerations of
Boyer, supra note 2, at 86; Brewer, supra note 2, at 88.
See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), where the Supreme
Court abstained from meeting an attack on the constitutionality of statutes
characterized by the district court as "parts of the general plan of massive
resistance to the integration of schools." The Court emphasized the avoidance of unnecessary interference by federal courts with proper and validly
administered state concerns, and a possible state court interpretation which
would avoid the constitutional question. rd. at 176, 177. See also, Albertson v. Millard, 345 U.S. 242 (1953); Musser v. utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
94 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965). For example, the
judgment on the merits in Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), was
reached almost seven years after the institution of litigation. See also the
extensive litigation leading to Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964).
05 380 U.S. at 490.
96 rd. See Cox v. Louisiana, 348 F.2d 750, 752 (5th Cir. 1965); NAACP
v. Thompson, 357 F.2d 831, 833 (5th Cir. 1966).
97 It is possible that use of a patently invalid statute, or one previously
declared unconstitutional as applied to the same or similar circumstances,
would be an "indicia" of bad faith. See Aelony v. Pace, 8 RACE REL. L.
REP. 1355 (M.D. Ga. 1963); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga.
1966). Both cases involve the use of a statute declared unconstitutional in
Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937).
98 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
99 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
100 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 164 (1943).
92
93
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comity have never included allowing a bad faith prosecution to
proceed unimpeded. Comity, which presumes that state courts will
function in good faith and give paramount consideration to protecting first amendment rights, cannot prevent interference in
state proceedings when an attack on those very presumptions is
established.
Whereas the nature of the prosecution, rather than the constitutionality of the statute, is crucial in the bad faith attack, the opposite is true in the vagueness attack. Here, regardless of the good
faith and diligence of the state prosecutor or available procedures
in state courts,t°l it is the dangers inherent in the vague statute
that makes abstention inappropriate.
In these circumstances, to abstain is to subject those affected to the uncertainties and vagaries of criminal prosecution, whereas the reasons for the vagueness doctrine in
the area of expression demand no less than freedom from
prosecution prior to a construction adequate to save the
statute. In such cases, abstention is at war with the purposes of the vagueness doctrine, which demands appropriate federal relief regardless of the prospects for expeditious determination of state criminal prosecutions. 102
"Well intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law."103
The policies underlying abstention go directly to protecting the
integrity of the state judicial process, either in reality or image.
There is no question that a functioning, viable federalism reqUires a series of state court systems which are entitled to the
confidence of the people. 104 But when first amendment freedoms
"of transcendent value to all society"105 require immediate protection,106 and it is likely that the lowest state court would view
protection of these freedoms as impairing the integrity of that court
or some local policy,t°7 it is essential that the federal trial forum be
101 Many district court opinions cite availability of state procedures as
a reason for abstaining from decision or for withholding relief. However,
it should be clear that unless the entire constitutional challenge can be
avoided in a "single state proceeding" by a decision on an independent
issue of state law, the availability of state procedures and remedies is irrelevant to the federal remedy. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961),
McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). It should be noted that
in Dombrowski, the Orleans Parish District Court had summarily vacated
the first arrest and search warrants. This availability of state remedies,
and demonstration of "good faith" by the state court, did not in any way
bar federal relief.
102 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 492 (1965).
103 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).
104 The "comity" principle operates on the presumption that the state
courts have, and are entitled to have, this "confidence" of the people.
105 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 486 (1965).
106 See Brewer, supra note 2, at 88; Boyer, supra note 2, at 86.
107 See Brewer, supra note 2, at 85; Boyer, supra note 93, at 85.
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available for immediate relief. Where delay is the very evil to be
prevented, abstention in favor of a procedure which promotes delay
is totally inappropriate. !Os
It appears therefore, that the various burdens of a criminal prosecution cannot be imposed on an individual or class raising
either of the two Dombrowski challenges. If a requirement of
Douglas is that the criminal proceeding be brought "lawfully and in
good faith,"109 an exception to Douglas exists when the criminal
proceeding is brought in bad faith. To require a defendant to go
through the entire proceeding to challenge its existence merely
compounds the "chilling effect" which the Court wishes to prevent. 110 In a prosecution under a vague or overbroad statute, the
process of "hammering out the structure of the statute piecemeal"111 (as is inevitable in a prosecution where the court must
deal "with only a narrow portion of the prohibition at anyone
time"112) cannot obviate the unconstitutional uncertainty for persons other than the defendant.
III.

THE FIRST VARIATION: CAMERON

v. JOHNSON

The next case to raise some of the Dombrowski issues was
Cameron v. Johnson.1l3 While Dombrowski floundered in the district court in Louisiana, Cameron fared no better before a three
See Lusky, supra note 34, at 1164, where he states:
[D]elay for its own sake-obstructionism-violates the pivotal compact of the open society, the terms of which are: ungrudging acceptance of the present law in return for effective access to the processes
of orderly change. Such violation destroys faith in those processes
and constitutes a direct invitation to "self-help," that is, the achievement of desired objectives by force or illegal pressure tactics. Selfhelp is the negation of civil order; and if employed on a broad scale,
it brings on the pervasive coercion of the police state.
109 Douglas v. City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
110 A colleague, who insists upon anonymity, suggests a colorful, if not
altogether valid, analogy. If a doctor prescribes heart surgery for a patient
when, in fact, heart surgery is completely inappropriate, it is of little comfort to the patient to be told that the doctor will use only the best surgical
procedures, and will proceed in good faith.
111 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491 (1965).
112 Id.
113 381 U.S. 741 (1965).·
Two earlier cases presenting certain of the
issues raised in Cameron were Baines v. Danville, 337 F.2d 579 (4th Cir:
1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 939 (1965); and Wells v. Hand, 238 F. Supp.
779 (M.D. Ga.), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Wells v. Reynolds, 382 U.S. 39
(1965). Baines refused to find 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) an exception to 28
U.S.C. § 2283 (1964). Wells abstained as to a Georgia statute subsequently
held unconstitutional in Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga.
1966). See Bailey, supra note 2, at 93; Comment, Theories of Federalism
and Civil Rights, 75 YALE L.J. 1007, 1035 (1966).
• After this article was written, the Supreme Court issued its second
opinion in Cameron v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W. 4319 (April 22, 1968), on appeal from the district court's decision on remand. See the author's Closing
Note at the conclusion of this article.
lOS
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judge panel in Mississippi. 114 Reverend Cameron, leader of a voterregistration drive, had sought a declaratory judgment against the
Mississippi Unlawful Picketing statute,115 and an injunction against
prosecution under this statute. The statute was passed unanimously by the Mississippi Legislature on April 8, 1964, after a 10
week picketing campaign by Negro Mississippians to enforce their
constitutional right to register and vote. Reverend Cameron was
threatened with arrest on April 9, and on April 10, he, along with
"forty-odd other persons," was arrested 116 and state court prosecutions were begun. The federal action was initiated three days after
the arrests.
Plaintiffs alleged both that the plan, purpose, or design1l7 in the
passage and enforcement of the statute was to "discourag[e]
protected activities,"118 and that it was unconstitutionally vague
and overbroad. l19 The court considered the "bad faith" attack on
the merits and found "that there was no such plan, or purpose, or
design or intendment of [the statute],"120 and that the state was
prosecuting plaintiffs "in good faith." It refused, however, to determine the statute's constitutionality.121
The court felt abstention appropriate on the vagueness and
overbreadth attack for a number of reasons. First, "the courts of
Mississippi have not construed the Act . . . ."122 Second, plaintiffs
had an "effective and efficient statutory remedy ... available to
them"123 in the state courts. Third, "petitioner has invoked the
jurisdiction of the state court ... by filing a motion to quash the
affidavits on the ground that the Act is unconstitutional"124 and
this indicates an adequate remedy at law. Even though the
court states that these reasons support abstention, it strongly indicated that, in its view, the statute is constitutiona1. 125 This, in
fact, appeared to be the real ground for the decision to abstain.
Judge Rives in dissent spoke solely to the vagueness attack:
In my opinion, the statute is so clearly unconstitutional
that this case is hardly one "required ... to be heard and
determined by a district court of three judges. . . ." On
114 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846 (S.D. Miss. 1964). This first
district court opinion is referred to in the text as Cameron I.
115 MIss. CODE ANN. § 2318.5 (1964). The law is often referred to as
House Bill 546, Mississippi Laws, 1964.
116 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 856 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (Rives,
dissenting) .
117 Id. at 848.
118 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 490 (1965).
119 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 850 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
120 Id. at 848.
121 Id. at 848, 849, 851.
122 Id. at 848.
123
124
125

Id.
Id. at 854.
Id. at 851, 855.
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the subject of abstention, I need not repeat in this dissent
the argument contained in my dissenting opinion in Bailey
v. Patterson . . . .126
On April 26, 1965, the Supreme Court decided Dombrowski, and
on June 7, 1965, issued the now famous per curiam order in
Cameron.
Appellants brought this action, inter alia, under 42 U.S.C.
§1983 (1958 ed.), to enjoin enforcement of the Mississippi
Anti-Picketing statute, on the grounds that it was an unconstitutionally broad regulation of speech, and that it
was being applied for the purpose of discouraging appellants' civil rights activities.
The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis is
granted. The judgment is vacated and the cause remanded
for reconsideration in light of Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479. On remand, the District Court should first consider whether 28 U.S.C. §2283 (1958 ed.) bars a federal
injunction in this case, see 380 U.S. at 484, n.2. If §2283
is not a bar, the court should then determine whether relief is proper in light of the criteria set forth in Dombrowski. 127
The Supreme Court's opinion is interesting, not only for the support the remand order seems to give to Dombrowski's vitality, but
for Justice Black's dissenting opinion arguing, it seems, for a severely limited Dombrowski. 128 Justice Black's dissent deserves
more than casual mention because his interpretation has since
been applied by a number of three judge panels,129 and because
Cameron is again before the Supreme Court.130 It is therefore
likely that Black's theory will soon be put to the test.
Black is convinced that the Unlawful Picketing statute is constitutional. He sees no reason for the remand, feeling that the
Court should decide the issues before it rather than delay adjudication further. l31 He also refuses to accept any argument that the
statute is vague or overbroad. 132 However, the Supreme Court had
not decided Dombrowski when the district court rendered its
decision in Cameron U 33 To allow the lower court to reconsider its
decision in light of Dombrowski, therefore, is consistent with an
unstated premise of Dombrowski that it is the district court, not
126 Id. at 858 (Rives, dissenting). See Bailey v. Patterson, 199 F. Supp.
595 (S.D. Miss. 1961), vacated and remanded, 369 U.S. 31 (1962).
127 381 U.S. at 741.
128 Id. at 742 (dissenting opinion).
129 Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967); Zwicker v.
Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967); Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp.
873 (S.D. Miss. 1966). This district court opinion is referred to in the
opinion as Cameron II.
130 Prob. juris. noted, 389 U.S. 809 (1967).
131 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 752 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
132 Id. at 745, 749-50.
133 See note 114 supra.
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the Supreme Court, that is to bear primary responsibility in these
cases.134 Further, with one judge in the district court dissenting on
the validity of the statute, it was not unrealistic to assume that a
declaration of the statute's invalidity might be rendered on remand. The two abstaining judges would now have to deal directly
with the constitutionality issue.
Judge Rives is just as certain that the statute is unconstitutional
as Justice Black is that it is valid. 135 Black's statement that holding the statute unconstitutional "somehow takes away from the
States" the right "to control their streets and ingress and egress to
and from their public buildings"136 overstates the issue. The issue,
of course, is not whether the state has such power, but whether the
Unlawful Picketing statute was a constitutional exercise of that
power. lS7
More difficult to understand than his feeling that the statute is
valid, is Justice Black's apparent misreading of both the lower court
opinion in Cameron and the Supreme Court decision in Dombrowski. Justice Black states,
We understand from the District Court's opinion and conclusions of law that it did not dismiss the complaint on the
ground that it thought it necessary to have the state
courts construe the statute, but rather on the ground that
having found the statute constitutional it dismissed in
order for the criminal cases to be tried in the state courts.13S
Although, as previously indicated, Cameron I made several statements supporting the constitutionality of the statute, it specifically holds,
In this case it is not necessary to pass on the constitutionality of this Act, even though there can be slight doubt as to
its constitutionality, and where it is rather clear that it is
constitutional, the Courts lean to a doctrine hereinbefore
announced of abstention until it is passed upon by the
courts of the State. 13D
And further, "Weare of the opinion that under the law and the
facts of this case it is the duty of the Federal Courts to abstain and
permit the plaintiffs to pursue their state remedies, as they have
already commenced to do."140 The district court goes to great
134 Lusky, supra note 34, at 1178-84, 1191; Wisdom, The Frictionmaking,
Exacerbating Political Role of Federal Courts, 21 Sw. L.J. 411 (1967).

135 Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 858 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
136 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 751 (1965).
137 See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Cameron v. Johnson, 244
F. Supp. 846, 857-58 (S.D. Miss. 1964) (dissenting opinion).
138 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 745 n.6 (1965) (emphasis added).
Black did not participate in Dombrowski.
13D Cameron v. Johnson, 244 F. Supp. 846, 851 (1964) (emphasis added).
140 Id. at 855-56.
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length to discuss Supreme Court abstention cases to support its
viewY1 Justice Black finds what is hinted at but is not there: a
holding that the statute is constitutional.
Black's view of Dombrowski is that, rather than allowing injunctive relief if either a vague or overbroad statute or a prosecution
initiated to deter free speech is established, relief should be forthcoming only where both evils are present. Dombrowski approved
injunctions against vague statutes affecting speech, he says, only
"where it was also alleged that the statute was part of a plan 'to
employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution' under the statute in a way that would discourage"142 the assertion of constitutional rights. He goes on to state that, "This Court in Dombrowski held, as I read the opinion, that an injunction against any enforcement of any kind of the state statute ... could issue there
only because . . . there were threats of prosecution purely to harrass .... "143 This interpretation would severely restrict its application.144
Dombrowski clearly holds abstention inappropriate where "statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression or as applied for the purpose of discouraging protected activities."145 If one attack or the other is sufficient to require a decision on the merits, certainly some relief was intended to be
forthcoming should plaintiffs prevail. And in determining the
presence of "irreparable harm" so as to support injunctive relief,
the two evils must be analyzed separately.
As previously discussed,146 the chilling of first amendment activities springs differently from the two evils. The more certain it
appears that a prosecution is for the bad faith purpose of deterring
free speech or assembly, the less relevant is the constitutionality of
the statute under which the prosecution is proceeding. In this
situation, "it is obvious that defense in a state criminal prosecution
will not suffice to avoid irreparable injury."147 It is not difficult
for an even slightly sophisticated prosecutor to avoid facially invalid laws, but still accomplish his insidious purpose of stifling
speech activities. 148 Whether the local government's hostility
against a person is a result of his race, his religion, or his political
views, requiring the presence of a facially invalid statute as a pre141

[d. at 852-55.

142 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 748 (1965). See Comment, supra
note 113, at 1034, whose author seems to feel that Black's theory is the
appropriate one, although recognizing that Dombrowski held otherwise.
143 381 U.S. at 748.
144 See 1966 DUKE L.J. 219, 232.
145 380 U.S. at 489-90 (emphasis added).
146 See text accompanying notes 29-62 supra. See note 2 supra.
147 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 755 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
148 For a description of the trend in Mississippi, see Lusky, supra note
34, at 1168-70.
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requisite to considering the attack on the legitimacy of state action
emasculates the basic concept of immediate federal protection for
first amendment freedoms.
On the other hand, the more vague, indefinite, and overbroad a
statute is, the more likely people desiring to speak out will be
silenced by the language of the statute itself, regardless of the attitudes or actions of state officials in starting a prosecution. Further, the more vague the statute, the more likely that a court,
prosecutor, or policeman will be acting with the honest belief that
a violation of the statute has in fact occurred. One evil of a vague
or overbroad statute is that, by its terms, it allows too wide a scope
of application by those with the duty of charging violations.
It will not do to say that a prosecutor's sense of fairness
and the Constitution would prevent a successful . . . prosecution for some of the activities seemingly embraced
within the sweeping statutory definitions. The hazard of
being prosecuted for knowing but guiltless behavior remains.... Well-intentioned prosecutors and judicial safeguards do not neutralize the vice of a vague law.149
Justice Black's requirement that both evils be present to justify
injunctive relief would severely constrict the broadened concept of
"irreparable harm" worked out by the Court in Dombrowski and
other recent cases. 150
In Cameron 1]151 the district court reaffirmed that the prosecutions were in "good faith," held the statute constitutional, and found
that section 2283 barred relief as to the pending prosecutions, with
section 1983 being no exception. Judge Rives again dissented/ 52
reiterating his earlier view that section 1983 is an exception to section 2283, and that "the statute is ... clearly unconstitutional."153
He added that the evidentiary record "clearly shows that section
2318.5 [the Unlawful Picketing statute] was unconstitutionally
applied."154
The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Cameron II,
and will now hopefully resolve two of the key "unsettled" Dombrowski problems. First, does section 2283 (the Anti-Injunction
statute) bar relief sought under the Civil Rights Act?155 To the
149

Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 373 (1964).

150 Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Baggett v. BUl!itt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1962); United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147
(1959); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
151 Cameron v. Johnson, 262 F. Supp. 873 (S.D. Miss. 1966).
152 Id. at 881-97.
153 Id. at 882.
154 Id. at 890.
165 The Anti-Injunction statute is 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964).
The Civil
Rights Act is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See Cameron v. Johnson, 36 U.S.L.W.
4319, 4320 n.3 (April 22, 1968), and the author's Closing Note at the end
of this article.
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extent that Dombrowski considers abstention inappropriate in certain first amendment cases, it would appear unlikely that section
2283, which is the legislative embodiment of the comity doctrine
repudiated by Dombrowski, could be allowed to stand as a bar to
relief without substantially destroying the Dombrowski remedy.156
Dombrowski found abstention inappropriate when a bad faith or
facial invalidity attack is appropriately alleged prior to initiation of
a prosecution. Cameron will decide the propriety of abstention subsequent to the initiation of a prosecution.
Second, assuming the Court finds that section 2283 does not
bar consideration of plaintiffs' claims on their merits, it may have
to deal with Justice Black's thesis that both evils are necessary
to warrant injunctive relief. If the Unlawful Picketing statute is
found unconstitutional, but the Court accepts the lower court's
finding of no bad faith, will relief be forthcoming? And should
the Court find that the Mississippi legislature and prosecuting officials used an otherwise valid statute to destroy plaintiffs' constitutionally protected picketing, will relief be granted?
IV.

MULTIPLE VARIATIONS: THE Two CAMPS

Since Dombrowski, and even more so since Black's dissent in
Cameron, district courts have placed themselves into two camps
that are opposed in philosophy of federalism and in decisions. The
following quotations are from cases which were decided four days
apart in late October 1967 and which involved similar fact situations
and attacks on statutes.
There is no showing of irreparable injury which is requisite to justify federal equitable relief, or of the special circumstances that would warrant federal disruption of the
normal pattern of raising constitutional defenses in the
course of the state criminal proceedings. . .. If the challenged laws are void for vagueness or overbreadth, the
state courts are fully capable of so ruling.157
Any unconstitutional statute, attempting to regulate First
Amendment rights, which has been invoked, or as here, in
reasonable anticipation of future events will be invoked,
against a member of society, does, in and of itself, result in
a suppression of constitutional rights, i.e., "chilling effect."
Accordingly, we find ourselves unable to invoke the abstention doctrine as urged upon us by the defendants, and
therefore take jurisdiction of this case under the authority
expressed in Dombrowski v. Pfister. 158
156 The history and analysis of 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1964), and its relation
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964), has been detailed in numerous articles. See
particularly, H. HART & M. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 1075-78 (1953); Bailey, supra note 2, at 122-24; Boyer, supra note
2, at 66-72, 88-96; Brewer, supra note 2, at 97-103; 50 VA. L. REV. 1404
(1964) .
157 Brooks v. Briley, 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
158 Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).
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The first, reminiscent of Douglas, is typical of those courts still
reluctant to affirmatively protect first amendment freedoms. The
latter, citing and implementing Dombrowski, is indicative of those
courts now eager, in appropriate circumstances, to aggressively
and quickly vindicate state infringement on those same freedoms.
While it seems clear that Dombrowski's mandate makes the eager
courts correct and the reluctant courts in error, the eager courts
often fail to deal adequately with the abstention and anti-injunction statute problems which the reluctant courts overemphasize,
and even misuse, to justify avoiding decision. The views of these
two camps must confront each other squarely or federal relief may
continue to turn on the federal district in which one happens to
file suit.

A. The Reluctant Courts
Zwickler v. Koota and Zwicker v . .BolF 60 ride tandem in more
ways than the similarity of plaintiffs' names. Different facets of
a number of crucial "unsettled" issues, as well as the replay of some
supposedly "settled" ones, are presented.
159

1.

ZWICKLER V. KOOTA

During the 1966 congressional campaign, Sanford Zwickler desired to distribute unsigned political leaflets attacking a local congressman. Section 781-b of the New York Penal Law makes such
action a criminal offense. No prosecution had been started against
Zwickler for his 1966 activities, and none had been affirmatively
threatened at the time that he initiated a federal action. He based
his apprehension of "threatened prosecution" on the fact that during the 1964 political campaign he had distributed the same unsigned leaflet, and was charged and convicted of a violation of section 781-b.l6l Zwickler alleged that section 781-b was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. He further alleged that he desired to
distribute leaflets as he did in 1964, but that District Attorney
Koota "intends or will again prosecute the plaintiff for his . . .
acts of distribution."162
The district court found Zwickler's vagueness and overbreadth
attack to be "not clearly frivolous," but refused to find that there
was an imminently threatened prosecution under the statute. The
159 261 F. Supp. 985 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), re?id and remanded, 389 U.S. 241
(1967).
160 270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
161 The conviction was ultimately reversed for insufficient evidence,
without reaching the constitutional challenges. People v. Zwickler, (Sup.
Ct., Kings Co., April 23, 1965), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 1069, 266 N.Y.S.2d 140, 213
N.E.2d 467 (1965).
162 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1966), rev'd and
remanded, 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
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court suggested that the suit was premature. Plaintiff's defense to
any prosecution which may come would assure him "adequate vindication of his alleged constitutional rights."163 In fact, in emphasizing the adequacy of state remedies, and therefore the absence
of that imminent harm which requires the federal court to face
the issues, the lower court indicated that if Zwickler did not want
to await the possible prosecution, he could "if he desires, institute
an action in the state court for a declaratory judgment."164
The Supreme Court reversed in Koota 165 as it had in Baggett,
Dombrowski, and Cameron. It found a key confusion in the lower
court's opinion. "Dombrowski teaches that the questions of abstention and of injunctive relief are not the same."166 Abstention is
inappropriate in cases where statutes are justifiably attacked on
their face as abridging free expression. 167 The Supreme Court specifically spells out what was not clearly articulated in Dombrowski. If the appropriate allegations are made, the federal court must
deal with the issues, not abstain and refer them to the state court.
The district court's suggestion that Zwickler file a declaratory judgment action in the state court is contrary to the mandates of Baggett, Dombrowski, and now Koota. In Baggett the court rejected
the idea that plaintiff had the burden to file a state declaratory
judgment suit. In Dombrowski the court affirmatively held that
the burden was on the state to seek clarification of a facially
vague and overbroad statute in the state court before the statute
can be used. 16s Now in Koota, it offers the plaintiff the alternative of a federal suit. And if that alternative is chosen, Koota
requires a decision on the merits.
In ... expanding federal judicial power, Congress imposed
the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to give due
respect to a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal constitutional claims.
It was error to refuse to pass on appellant's claim for a
declaratory judgment.161l
Koota isolates another issue. There is a difference in the reqUirements for obtaining declaratory rather than injunctive relief.
The Court requires two different burdens of proof for the two
types of relief. "Irreparable harm" need not be established to obtain declaratory relief. "It will be the task of the District Court

163 261 F. Supp. at 992.
164

Id. at 993.

165 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
Id. at 254.
Id. See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 601 n.9 (1967);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377
U.S. 360 (1964).
16S 380 U.S. at 491.
169 389 U.S. at 248, 252.
166
167
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on the remand to decide whether an injunction will be 'necessary
or appropriate' should appellant's prayer for declaratory relief prevail."170 Although Dombrowski's broadened interpretation of "irreparable harm" in first amendment cases brings these two burdens
of proof closer together, it remains to be seen how much more
harm must be shown, if any, after the issuance of a declaratory
judgment, to warrant an injunction.l7l
The delineation of a difference between the requirements for
declaratory and injunctive relief also raises an interesting possibility concerning Justice Black's views in Cameron. Black indicated
that to obtain "an injunction against the enforcement of any kind of
a state statute,"172 both a vague or overbroad statute and a plan to
harrass speech activities must be established. But Zwickler, rather
than alleging prosecutorial abuse, alleged instead that Koota was
a "diligent and conscientious public officer" who, "pursuant to his
duties intends or will again prosecute the plaintiff for his [intended] acts of distribution."173
Although the issue of whether one or both evils is required for
declaratory relief is not reached by the Supreme Court in Koota,
Black's concurrence in the remand portends that perhaps he is willing to allow declaratory relief if either Dombrowski evil is established, and only requires both for injunctive relief. A "bad faith"
prosecution may be the additional "harm" Justice Black would
require. 174
2.

ZWICKER V. BOLL

Zwicker v. BolP 75 presents many of the same problems as Koota,
but in a different posture. First, whereas in Koota one issue was

170 rd. at 255 (emphasis added).
171 One possibility would be that the plaintiff would have to show that
the state courts were not acting pursuant to the declaratory judgment. If
the state proceeded with pending prosecutions, or initiated new prosecutions, under the statute declared unconstitutional, injunctive relief would
be warranted. This is the assumption upon which the courts in Douglas v.
City of Jeanette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658
(W.D. Ky. 1967); Ware v. Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967)
proceeded.
172 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 748 (1965) (emphasis added).
173 Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F. Supp. 985, 988 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). The district court found this allegation inadequate to support either declaratory
or injunctive relief against the statute attacked as vague and overbroad,
because "there is no suggestion that the alleged threatened prosecution of
the plaintiffs will be undertaken in bad faith." The lower court therefore
extended Black's view on injunctive relief to a request for declaratory relief as well. This is not the Supreme Court's view, however.
174 Assuming on remand that the suit is not declared moot, see Zwickler
v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252-253, nn.15-16 (1967), the district court may have
to directly meet the issue of whether a bad faith prosecution, in addition
to a vague or overbroad statute, is a necessary element for declaratory, as
opposed to injunctive, relief.
175 270 F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
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whether the suit had been filed too early, the plaintiffs in BoH
(according to the district court) filed their suit too late, since the
misdemeanor prosecutions already had begun and not-guilty pleas
had been entered. Second, in Koota there had not been a constitutional interpretation of the statute in question by the state's
highest court, and the district court stated this as a reason for absention.176 In Boll, there had been a state supreme court interpretation of the statute in question, and the district court abstained
on the ground that the constitutional issue had already been resolved in favor of the statute. 177
BoH arose out of the arrest of 19 antiwar demonstrators on the
University of Wisconsin Madison campus. State criminal complaints were filed shortly after arrest charging them with disorderly conduct. All were immediately arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Prior to trial, a Dombrowski-type complaint was filed alleging prosecution in bad faith and prosecution under a vague and
overbroad statute. As in Dombrowski, the panel never held an
evidentiary hearing, but only heard legal arguments on the vagueness attack. The court, in a two to one decision, dismissed the
suit without reaching any substantive issue, indicating they would
abstain since the issues were appropriate for decision in the state
criminal proceeding.
The decision of the court stated that "[a]pplying common sense
principles of comity to the existing situation, I find no compelling
reason why this court should assert power to decide these issues in
this action."178 The court avoided the question of whether section
1983 is an exception to section 2283, stating that "it is not necessary" to make such a determination.179 The concurring judge
rested his abstention primarily on the dictates of section 2283, although stating agreement with the court's opinion.
In my view an act of Congress, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, even
when read together with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, forbids this court
from staying the state court actions, and impliedly, at
least admonishes us, if it does not prohibit us from superseding, in effect, the state court resolution of these federal
issues by issuing a declaratory judgment.180
An important difference between BoH and Koota is that in Boll
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had met a vagueness attack on the
disorderly conduct statute by declaring it constitutional' in State
v. Givens. 181 Therefore, the rationale that the federal court should
176 261 F. Supp. at 992-93.
177 The Wisconsin Supreme Court found the disorderly conduct statute
challenged in Boll to be not unconstitutionally vague in State v. Givens, 28
Wis. 2d 109, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965).
178 Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131, 134 (w.n. Wis. 1967).
179 rd. at 136.
180 rd. at 137 (concurring opinion).
181 28 Wis. 2d 109, 135 N.W.2d 780 (1965).
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abstain when the highest state court has not had an opportunity
to interpret the statute should have been inapplicable here. Yet
the court in Boll abstained and sent the case back to the state for
a "second bite," while the Supreme Court in Koota remanded for
consideration on the merits in spite of the lack of a New York
Court of Appeals interpretation of the statute.
The Boll court badly confused three points. It failed to distinguish between the two distinct Dombrowski evils; it failed to recognize the difference between determining whether it will abstain, and determining whether relief is appropriate; and it failed
to understand the requirements for obtaining the two distinct types
of relief requested-declaratory and injunctive.
In failing to distinguish the vagueness and overbreadth attack
from the prosecutorial abuse attack, the court showed the same
confusion displayed by the lower court in Koota. Even under
Black's narrowing conception of the problem, it is not disputed that
there are two separate evils. Justice Black thinks both must be
present to warrant injunctive relief; Dombrowski indicated either
is sufficient. But the Boll court argued that it would abstain on
the vagueness question because bad faith had not been established. Further, the court continued, since the Wisconsin Supreme
Court had already upheld the constitutionality of the statute, there
was no need to consider it anew. 182
But any discussion of the failure to establish bad faith is irrelevant. The conduct of the plaintiffs/83 the motives and purposes
of the state in pursuing the prosecution, and the availability of
state procedures to raise the issues are all irrelevant under the
vagueness and overbreadth wing of Dombrowski. Further, even if
certain conduct were relevant, no evidentiary hearing was allowed,
and factual conclusions were therefore inappropriate. It is precisely because the Wisconsin Supreme Court has upheld the statute in a former prosecution that Dombrowski requires federal decision in this case. Justice Brennan said:
Because of the sensitive nature of constitutionally protected expression, we have not required that all of those
subject to overbroad regulations risk prosecution to test
their rights. . . . If the rule were otherwise, the contours
of regulation would have to be hammered out case by case
-and tested only by those hardy enough to risk criminal
prosecution to determine the proper scope of regulation.
.. Moreover, we have not thought that the improbabil182 270 F. Supp. at 135-36.
183 When plaintiff's conduct appears from the indictments to be "hard
core," i.e., conduct that would obviously be prohibited under any construction of the statute being attacked as vague, plaintiff may lose his standing to attack the statute in this collateral fashion. See Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985
(N.D. Ga. 1967).
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ity of successful prosecution makes the case different. The
chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment
rights may derive from the fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or faiZure. 184
Dombrowski's command that abstention is inappropriate in certain first amendment cases does not mean that the plaintiffs will
necessarily prevail, or that if they prevail they will be entitled to
injunctive relief. What it does mean is that the federal court, not
the state court, has the duty to decide the first amendment issues.
"Plainly, escape from that duty is not permissible merely because
state courts also have the solemn responsibility, equally with the
federal courts."185 Boll fails to recognize this difference. It seems
to operate on the assumption that if the court foregoes abstention,
plaintiffs have prevailed. But abstention goes to the exercise of
jurisdiction, not to the granting of relief.
We yet like to believe that wherever the Federal courts
sit, human rights under the Federal Constitution are
always a proper subject for adjudication, and that we
have not the right to decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the rights asserted may be adjudicated
in some other forum. 186
Finally, Koota makes clear that the requirements for declaratory
and injunctive relief are distinct. Boll treats the requirements for
each type of relief as identical.

3.

BROOKS

v. BRILEY

Brooks v. BriZey187 is the most recent case to accept Black's reasoning as persuasive. Plaintiffs, members and officers of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), challenged the
legitimacy of the prosecution of three of their members under
various Tennessee statutes. The charges grew out of disturbances
in Nashville, Tennessee. A full evidentiary hearing was held on
plaintiffs' charge that officials of Nashville had purposely pro-

184 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 491-92 (1965) (emphasis added).

Givens considered only a vagueness attack on WIS. STAT. § 947.01 (1) (1963).

See Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926). This was pointed
up by the dissent in Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131, 144 (W.D. Wis.
1967). Zwickler v. Koota indicates that disposing of the "vagueness" attack
does not meet the "overbreadth" attack.
Appellant's challenge is not that the statute is void for vagueness,
... [but rather] his constitutional attack is that the statute, although
lacking neither clarity nor precision, is void for "overbreadth," that
is, that it offends the constitutional principle that "a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to
state regulational may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms."
389 U.S. at 249-50.
185 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
186 Id.
187 274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967).
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voked the violence which occurred and were now prosecuting them
in bad faith. The court's characterization of the issue in the case
telegraphs its decision: "[T] he action, basically, involves the right
of state and municipal law enforcement authorities, including the
local police, to cope effectively with a serious outbreak of violence
and lawlessness without interference from the long arm of a federal injunction."188 In a lengthy decision, the court stated,
we find to be devoid of factual support, and indeed even
fanciful, the plaintiffs' charge that policemen and other
officers and officials of the Metropolitan Government of
Nashville, combined or conspired in bad faith to harass
the plaintiffs and to deprive them of their constitutionally protected rights. 189
The court also held that a class action could not be maintained
and that it would abstain on the constitutionality of the challenged
statutes, leaving the remaining individual plaintiffs to their criminal defense in the state courts.190 The court reasoned that bad
faith on the part of the state, in prosecuting under a vague and
overbroad statute, must be established before the court will consider the vagueness challenge. 19l
The court further found no "chilling effect" on plaintiffs' exercise of their rights of free speech arising from the vague statutes.
As with "bad faith," the court considered irreparable harm as to
the vagueness attack to be an objectively ascertainable series of
facts, discoverable only through a perusal of the evidence. Since
no such "harm" seems to have been demonstrated from the hearing, the court abstained.
Making the same mistake found in the district court decisions in
Boll, Koota, and Dombrowski itself, the court in Brooks failed to
understand Dombrowski's broadened interpretation of "irreparable
harm"-that in the area of speech activities, injury is assumed from
the existence of the vague statute. This misunderstanding led the
court to indicate that state remedies, including defense of the
criminal actions, will protect plaintiffs' rights.
But even assuming that the plaintiffs in Brooks did not establish that they were entitled to relief, the court made the more
basic error of abstaining. The court misinterpreted not only Dombrowski, but Black's dissent in Cameron. Although Black feels
prosecutorial abuse is necessary to injunctive relief, he clearly does
not support abstention. Koota also made clear that the question
of the quantity and quality of injury necessary to obtain an injunction is distinct from the question of the propriety of abstention.
Further, since declaratory relief may be granted "irrespective of
Id. at 541 (emphasis added).
Id.
190 Id. at 549.
191 Id. at 551.
188
189
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... the propriety of an injunction,"102 a finding of "irreparable
harm" is not only unnecessary to forego abstention, but may be
unnecessary to obtain declaratory relief.
B.

1.

The Eager Courts
CARMICHAEL V. ALLEN

On September 8, 1966, Stokely Carmichael, then Chairman of
SNCC, was arrested in Atlanta, Georgia, on charges of riot and disorderly conduct.103 On September 13 and 14, seventeen others,
including seven SNCC workers, were charged with riot or "circulating insurrectionary literature,"194 or both.
On September 9, 1966, a federal suit was filed 195 attacking the
attempts to prosecute as "a bad faith effort to interfere with admitted rights by misuse of the state's criminal procedures,"196 a~d
as based on vague and overbroad 197 statutes. This latter attack was
made on the Georgia insurrection and riot statutes and on the disorderly conduct ordinance of Atlanta.
In Carmichael, a three judge panel declared four sections of the
insurrection statute and the entire disorderly conduct ordinance
unconstitutional. Attempted or threatened prosecutions were enjoined.10s The court abstained from determining the constitutionality of the riot statute on the ground that "the conduct
charged [in the indictment] would come within a possible permissible constitutional construction of the statute by the state
court,"199 obtainable in a single state proceeding.
Since it found five of the laws unconstitutional, it only discussed
the bad faith attack with regard to the riot statute. It held that
allegations that the statute was being used in bad faith, "regardless of whether [it] ... is constitutional or not,"200 entitled the
complaining parties to relief if true. The court concluded, however, after an evidentiary hearing, "that the plaintiffs have simply
failed to carry this burden."201
The Carmichael court clearly accepted the "double pronged attack" of Dombrowski,202 and rejected Black's Cameron dissent.
The vagueness attack alone, without regard to prosecutorial abuse,
192 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967).
193 The arrests were made under GA. CODE ANN.
Atlanta Ordinance § 20-7.
194 GA. CODE ANN. § 26-904 (1953).
195 Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (1965).
196 Id. at 987.

Id.
Id.
Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.

197

19S
199

at 993-95.
at 996.
at 997.
at 992.

§ 26-5302 (1953) and
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entitled the plaintiffs to declaratory and injunctive relief from
prosecutions under five of the laws. And only when the riot statute survived this first attack did the court go on to consider
whether it was being applied in bad faith. The relief denied in
Brooks as a "disruption of the delicate division of authority between federal and state governments," and an invitation "to disrespect for the law itself,"203 was granted in Carmichael as essential
to the protection of that "delicate division of authority."

2.

WARE V. NICHOLS

In October 1964, eight voter registration workers in Belzoni,
Mississippi, were arrested and charged with criminal syndicalism. 204 In Ware v. Nichols,205 the federal court struck down the
entire statute as "so vague and overbroad as to violate the First
Amendment rights read into state laws by the Fourteenth Amendment."206 Citing Dombrowski and Cameron, the court rejected defendants' urgings to abstain "until the Supreme Court of Mississippi has construed the Criminal Syndicalism Act."207 The court
responded simply, "In the circumstances this case presents, the abstention doctrine is inappropriate."208
Although declaring the Mississippi statute unconstitutional on
its face, the court denied an injunction on the assumption that "the
state and county officials will withhold any action to enforce the
Act, until a final judgment is rendered. Should this case not be
appealed or should the Supreme Court affirm our judgment on
appeal, we may assume that the charges against the plaintiffs will
be dismissed."209 The court, therefore, did not reach "the question
of whether 28 U.S.C. 1343, 42 U.S.C. 1971, and 28 [sic] U.S.C. 1983
are exceptions to 28 U.S.C. 2283, the federal anti-injunction statute."210 Like Douglas, it assumed that the declared invalidity of the
statute removed the threat of prosecution and hence the need for
an injunction.
The Ware court not only accepted the Dombrowski two-pronged
attack, but recognized the Koota distinction between declaratory
and injunctive relief. The court did not seek "irreparable harm"
in the facts of the case, as was sought by the district courts in
203 274 F. Supp. at 552.
204 MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 2066.5-01 to .5-06 (Supp. 1964).
205 266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967).
206 Id. at 569.
207 Id. at 566.
208 Id.
209 Id. at 569.
210 Id. Judge Wisdom, concurring, would find all three sections to be
exceptions to § 2283. In addition to agreeing that the statute is invalid,
he would find that there had been prosecutorial abuse, since plaintiffs did
"nothing more than express opposition to their subordinate place in society." Id.
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Boll, Koota, and Brooks, but reiterated that the threat of sanctions
arising from the overbroad statute has a sufficient chilling effect
to require immediate federal intervention in the form of a declaratory judgment.
3.

MCSURELY V. RATLIFF

In the closest replay of Dombrowski to come before the courts,
the McSurelys and the Bradens, officials and field organizers of
the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Inc. (SCEF), and
Joseph Mulloy, a field representative for Appalachian Volunteers,
were arrested in Pike County, Kentucky, and charged with advocating sedition and criminal syndicalism. 211 A federal suit was
brought on September 1, 1967, to enjoin the criminal proceedings. 212 In what must be considered the most exciting victory for a
vigorous Dombrowski doctrine, the panel declared the pertinent
section of the Kentucky sedition statute unconstitutional, and issued
a permanent injunction against present or future prosecutions under the statute. In its two page unpublished order, the court
stated: "Being of the opinion that K.R.S. 432.040 is unconstitutional, we find under the circumstances of this case that Dombrowski v. Pfister is applicable and the doctrine of abstention is not
applicable."213
The court's opinion, issued several weeks after the order, found
the statute clearly unconstitutional, and preempted by federal
legislation. The court disposed of the defendants' assertions that
the doctrine of abstention, as well as the prohibition of the antiinjunction statute, barred relief. Abstention, the court felt, was
precluded because a rehabilitation of the statute was impossible.
The statute was so broad and sweeping that nothing short of rewriting it could bring it within permissible constitutional limitations.214 The anti-injunction statute was not a bar since, like in
Dombrowski, an indictment had not been returned, and there211 All five were charged under Ky. REV. STAT. § 432.040 (1962). As in
Dombrowski, plaintiffs' homes were searched at the time of their arrest
and their libraries and official and personal files were seized and removed
from the premises. The seized documents, like those seized from Dombrowski and others, were of great interest to a congressional committee.
In this case, Senator McClellan's Subcommittee on Investigations immediately subpeonaed the seized documents from Ratliff. In the course of the
proceedings to challenge the legitimacy of the subpeona, and the investigation pursuant to which it was issued, the United States Supreme Court
has twice restrained Ratliff from releasing the seized material pending a
final decision on the challenges. McSurely v. Ratliff, 389 U.S. 949 (1967);
McSurely v. Ratliff, 390 U.S. 914 (1968).
212 McSurely v. Ratliff, Civil No. 1146 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 14, 1967).
213 McSurely v. Ratliff, Order No. 1146 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 14, 1967). The
order in McSurely was issued from the bench after only two hours of
deliberation.
214 In 1920 the Governor of Kentucky asserted that the law "goes far
afield and far beyond syndicalism and sedition." Id. at 1.
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fore no "proceeding" was pending in the state court at the time the
federal suit was filed.
The court, echoing Ware and Carmichael, found irreparable harm
in the "sweeping application" of the statute, and required no factual
support from the particular events of the case, although it carefully considered the allegations and supporting documents. If
Dombrowski was meant to give an immediate remedy in the district courts, McSurely implemented that mandate without reservation.
4.

BAKER V. BINDER

Four days after the Tennessee federal court had abstained on the
issue of the constitutionality of several statutes in Brooks v. Briley,215 a three judge Kentucky panel decided Baker v. Binder. 216
The court declared three Kentucky statutes and three Louisville
ordinances "unconstitutional and void."217
"The thrust of the complaint [was] double edged in nature."218
It asked for declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of the
statutes and ordinances, and for injunctive relief from their enforcement against the plaintiffs on the ground that it was "carried forth
by defendants with the specific purpose and resultant effect of suppressing plaintiffs' peaceable protest against alleged racial discrimination in the sale and rental of housing in the city of Louisville,
Kentucky."219 The facts disclosed the nature of demonstrations by
the plaintiffs, the "heckling" by their opponents, and the conduct
of the police. 220
The court found no proof of "selective enforcement," "police
brutality," or "suppression of constitutional rights."221 The bad
faith allegations were dismissed with these words: "Very frankly,
we as a Court are at a loss to determine what the police could have
done, or left undone, under the circumstances, with which the plaintiffs would have found no fault."222 In Brooks, a failure to establish bad faith was the basis on which the court abstained from
considering the constitutional challenge to the statutes. But the
separate wings of Dombrowski were clearly understood and applied
in Baker.
Thus it is apparent that, in the judgment of this Court, the
plaintiffs, in all fairness and practicality, have no legitimate complaint in this situation could we but find that
all

of

the ordinances and statutes affecting freedom

215 See text accompanying notes 187-92
216 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967).

217
218
219
220
221
222

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 661-64.
at 659.
at 659-60.
at 660.

supra.
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expression in this litigation were constitutional. This we
are unable to do as we find certain of them vague and
overbroad, and of possible sweeping application. 223
The basis for relief was found in the statutes' susceptibility of
being used to suppress the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs,
even though the court specifically found that they had not been so
used in this case. Since the possible unconstitutional application,
"in and of itself, [may] result in a suppression of constitutional
rights, i.e., 'chilling effect' ... we find ourselves unable to invoke
the abstention doctrine as urged upon us by the defendants."224
As in Ware, the court issued declaratory judgments voiding the
six laws, but refused an injunction on the assumption that if plaintiffs ultimately prevailed, the state would dismiss all charges. Unlike Ware, however, the court specifically found "that the statutes
relied upon by the plaintiffs as the basis of their cause of action
[including section 1983] herein are exceptions to 28 U.SoC. 2283,"225
and that the court had the power to grant injunctive relief if it
became necessary.
C. Strengths and Weaknesses

We return to differences implicit in the quotations beginning
this discussion of the two camps. We find the reluctant courts, in
harking back to the Pullman-Douglas view, failing to recogt;lize
three accommodations which have been made in the traditional
balance between state and federal courts when first amendment
activities are threatened. First, they incorrectly declare that the
presence of a "bad faith" prosecution is essential to establish the
irreparable harm necessary to support relief under the vaguenessoverbreadth attack on a statute. Boll and Brooks 226 explicitly
agree with Justice Black that
an injunction against any enforcement of any kind of the
state statute ... could issue there only because (1) there
were threats of prosecutions purely to harrass, with no
hope of ultimate success, [and] (2) the law was challenged
as, and found to be on its face, an "overly broad and vague
regulation of expression. . . ."227
Carmichael, Baker, Ware, and McSurely, however, all accept the
"two pronged" theory of Dombrowski. None of these cases required proof of a "bad faith use" of the vague statute. The feared
chilling effect arising from the threatened prosecutions under the
Id. (emphasis added)
Id.
225 Id. at 664.
226 See also the district court opinions in Zwickler v. Koota, 261 F .. Supp.
985 (EoD.N.Y. 1966); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 227 F. Suppo 556 (E.D. La.
1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 215 F. Supp. 439 (WoD. Wash. 1963).
227 Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741, 748 (1964).
223
224

0
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statute was sufficient to support declaratory or injunctive relief.
Second, the reluctant courts improperly abstain. Koota made
crystal clear, if Dombrowski and Cameron did not, that an appropriate attack on a statute touching first amendment activities as
being, on its face, unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, is sufficient to require a federal trial court to decide the issue on the
merits. Other cases also require the foregoing of abstention when
the attack is on the legitimacy of the conduct of state officials,
whether in initiating a sham prosecution,228 intimidating Negroes
from voter registration,229 or a myriad of other activities which
infringe constitutionally protected federal rights. 230 Yet the courts
in Boll and Brooks found support, either in the common-law doctrines of comity and abstention, or in the anti-injunction statute,
section 2283, for abstention in cases in which Dombrowski and
Koota clearly dictate otherwise.
The eager courts, however, uniformly reject the applicability of
the abstention doctrine or the anti-injunction statute, either expressly or by implication, in granting relief. In all four cases, a
prosecution had been instituted prior to the filing of the federal
suit, but in one way or another, section 2283 was avoided. Baker
expressly found the Civil Rights Act to be an "exception" to section
2283. Carmichael and McSurely implicitly made this finding by
granting injunctive relief against the pending prosecutions. In
Carmichael, the issue was never discussed. In Ware, the court
avoided the statute's bar against "injunctions" by granting only
declaratory relief.281
228 Abstention as to a factual hearing was held inappropriate on the
"bad faith" attack in Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 498 (1965). See
also Baker v. Binder, 274 F. Supp. 658 (W.D. Ky. 1967); Brooks v. Briley,
274 F. Supp. 538 (M.D. Tenn. 1967); Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985
(N.D. Ga. 1966).
229 Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475
(1903). Compare United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962), with United States v. McLead, 385 F.2d 734
(5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Edwards, 333 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1964);
and United States v. Clark, 249 F. Supp. 720 (S.D. Ala. 1965). See 2 T.
EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 1105-1229 (Student ed. 1967).
230 See generally, 2 T. EMERSON, D. HABER & N. DORSEN, supra note 229,
for discussion of the problems of the legitimacy of state conduct with
regard to education, the administration of justice, employment, housing,
public accomodations, and welfare services.
231 In Baker, the court followed the Ware procedure and granted only
declaratory, and not injunctive, relief. The court in Baker did find § 1983
to be an exception to § 2283, however. It seems probable that once it is
decided that § 2283 does not bar declaratory relief, and such relief has
been granted, an injunction can be issued without worrying about the §
1983-§ 2283 problem because § 2283 specifically provided that an injunction may be issued against state court proceedings "to protect or effectuate" a judgment.
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The inarticulate premise on which these two camps differ on the
abstention issue is whether state court procedures and remedies
are likely to be effective in protecting first amendment rights. The
eager courts accept the underlying premise of Dombrowski that
to require resort to the state courts will probably render protection ineffective,232 and that federal procedures must be available
to grant immediate protection if relief is warranted. There is
little or no discussion of the abstention and comity arguments
that occupy so much space in the decisions of the reluctant courts
-arguments which, sotto voce, accept the premise that relief
through the state court system is available and adequate. 233
This failure of both sides to discuss the underlying issue has
weakened the decisions. In rushing to enforce Dombrowski's mandate, the eager courts have ignored, avoided, or summarily dealt
with the issues that should have been met directly. The reluctant
courts overuse, and sometimes misuse, ripeness, comity, and abstention arguments to avoid decision on questions which Dombrowski
commands them to decide. It is incumbent upon the eager courts
to meet these issues to strengthen Dombrowski and assert a new
aggressive federalism.
Finally, Boll and Brooks fail to adequately distinguish between
the requirements for declaratory and injunctive relief. Boll indicates that failure to establish need for injunctive relief also bars
declaratory relief. And Brooks indicates that "it is clear that the
prohibition under section 2283 against enjoining state court proceedings cannot be avoided by seeking a declaratory judgment."234
Koota seems to dispense with the notion that there is no difference
between declaratory and injunctive relief in this area.
Ware and Baker understood and acted upon this distinction even
before Koota was decided. Although Baker indicated that the
Civil Rights Act was an exception to the anti-injunction statute, it
refrained from issuing an injunction on the assumption that "the
Commonwealth of Kentucky and City officials will withhold any
enforcement action against ... plaintiffs."235 Ware acts upon the
same assumption in granting only declaratory relief, but" [does]
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
The point is only broached in Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985
(N.D. Ga. 1966), when the court abstains from determining the validity of
the Georgia riot statute on the grounds that (1) the indictments charged
"hard core" conduct, and (2) the statute was susceptible of a permissible
limiting construction in a single state criminal proceeding. Arguably, however, since the indictments were returned after the federal suit was filed,
and only because the federal court refused to issue a temporary restraining order, the court should have considered the case as falling within the
Dombrowski "loophole," 380 U.S. at 482 n.2, since the indictments were
returned only because the federal court erroneously refused to restrain the
state. See McSurely v. Ratliff, Civil No. 1146 (E.D. Ky., Sept. 14, 1967).
234 274 F. Supp. at 553.
235 274 F. Supp. at 664.
232
233
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not reach the question of whether . . . 1983 [is an] exception to
... 2283."236 Koota points up the distinction, therefore, in a suit
filed before any state proceeding was initiated. Ware and Baker,
operating on the same assumption about the conduct of state officials, but on differing legal interpretations of the relation between
sections 1983 and 2283, make this distinction operative in suits filed
after state criminal prosecutions have begun. 237
V.

PRESUMPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES

This article has, so far, been devoted primarily to an analysis of
the legal issues which must be resolved in providing maximum
protection for first amendment rights while accommodating the conflicts which may arise between state and federal courts. However,
these issues are decided within a conceptual framework of what
the problems are, how federalism works and should work in this
area, and what solutions are needed. Differing perspectives on
the social dangers posed by restricting the state in its administration of public order as opposed to restricting speech activities;
various presumptions about the operation of the state and federal
court systems; and an understanding of the need for immediate
rather than delayed protection of first amendment rights, shape
this framework. The aim of this conclusion is merely to pose some
relevant considerations about these problems.
Dombrowski did not change the view that first amendment
rights are of paramount importance in our social and political
scheme. Likewise, it did not really alter the understanding of the
threats to speech activities posed by vague or overbroad criminal
statutes. 238 What it did was begin to recognize that the "scheme of
things" has gone askew. The preferential treatment to be ac!l36 Ware v. Nichols, 266F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967). Both Ware and
Baker support the comity doctrine on the assumption that state officials
will heed the declaratory judgment.
237 Since the preparation of this article, many additional suits have been
filed requesting declaratory, injunctive, or other relief against threatened
or pending criminal prosecutions affecting first amendment rights. These
suits are all grounded in the theories made viable by Dombrowski. Cases
which have reached decision include Burmeister v. New York City Police
Dep't, 275 F. Supp. 690 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Landry v. Daley, Civil No. 67-C1863 (N.D. Ill., E. Div., March 1, 1968) (two opinions: one judge declaring
two Chicago ordinances unconstitutional; three judge court finding two
Illinois statutes valid). Cases still pending in federal district courts include
Soglin v. Kauffman, Civil No. 67-C-141 (W.D. Wis. 1967) (challenging
WIS. STAT. § 947.01 [1965], the disorderly eonduct statute challenged in
Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131 [W.D. Wis. 1967]); Wynn v. Bryne, Civil
No. 991-67 (D.N.J. 1967) (challenging the hundreds of prosecutions arising
out of the 1967 Newark riots); Burks v. Schott, Civil No. 6478 (S.D. Ohio
1967) (challenging prosecutions arising out of Cincinnati urban disorders);
Warren v. Groves, Civil No. 3483 (S.D. Ohio 1968) (challenging the Ohio
"riot" statute).
238 Amsterdam, supra note 66.
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corded first amendment freedoms in theory was not often enough
found where it counts: on the street, at the police station, in city
hall, or in the lowest state courts.
The doctrines of vagueness and overbreadth serve (in the area
of the first amendment) partly as a mediator between "all the
organs of public coercion of a state and . . . the institution of federal protection of the individual's private interests."239 Vagueness, basically a due process concept, rests primarily on the rationale that a person is entitled to a "fair warning" as to what
conduct is criminally proscribed. The rationale goes beyond this
to require that statutes also be specific so that a trial court may
properly judge guilt or innocence, and an appellate court may have
some meaningful frame of reference within which to review what
the trial court has done. Overbreadth is concerned with a criminal statute's language infringing first amendment activities, either
explicitly or by being susceptible to possible application to protected
conduct. The value decision which places speech activities in a
preferred position, bolstered by the supremacy clause, dictates to
the state that "when it approaches the foothills of First Amendment freedoms, it must step with far greater care"240 in proscribing
conduct than in other areas.
Both doctrines, however, are concerned with more than the precision of legislative drafting. They express substantive concerns.
Speaking to this, Professor Amsterdam has stated:
The doctrine determines, in effect, to what extent the administration of public order can assume a form which, first,
makes possible the deprivation sub silentio of the rights of
particular citizens and second, makes virtually inefficacious the federal judicial machinery established for the
vindication of those rights.241
Dombrowski, however, was not directed to any reevaluation of
the preference for free speech or the dangers of vague and overbroad statutes, but to the ways in which these preferences can be
asserted and these dangers met. 242
The real remaining conflict is which court system should initially
be allowed to consider these issues. Until Dombrowski, except
in extraordinary situations, it was assumed that the state court
239

[d. at 81.

Zwicker v. Boll, 270 F. Supp. 131, 147 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 81.
242 It is no hyperbole to say that the critical issues of human liberty in
this country today are not issues of rights, but of remedies. . . . The
American citizen has a right of free expression, but he may be
arrested, jailed, fined under guise of bail and put to every risk and
rancor of the criminal process if he expresses himself unpopularly.
The "right" is there on paper; what is needed is the machinery to
make the paper right a practical protection. Brief for NAACP Legal
Defense and Education Fund as Amicus Curiae, at 17-18, Dombrowski v. Pfister, 377 U.S. 976 (1964).
240

241
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system should consider the matter in the first instance, since it
was in a better position to construe its state's criminal statutes,
and since it was the state that would lose a weapon against civil
disorder should a statute fall. Because a properly functioning
state process is essential to a working federalism in the criminal
area, state courts should be reinforced in their roles as the primary
tribunals to consider these matters. But it is suggested, perhaps
rather obviously, that the state court's role, whether fulfilled or
not in reality, includes making sure that the state does not function in the criminal field so as to destroy or thwart federal rights.
There is a difference between what can generally be expected of a
state court when it is resolving conflicting state and federal ininterests in a particular case, and when it is the very existence
of the state court proceeding that is challenged as the threat to the
federal right. 243
Specifically, the maintenance of maximum freedom in the area of
speech is of paramount national interest. It should be of paramount state interest. The question therefore arises, as in Dombrowski, whether the very existence of a state criminal proceeding,
or a state criminal statute, will be destructive of this paramount
interest. It has been held time and again, for example, that various
prior restraints on speech activities are invalid, regardless of the
fact that, in a particular battle, "speech" may triumph over the
restraint (for example, a police chief with unlimited discretion to
issue parade permits does grant such a permit to organization X) .244
Dombrowski has determined that threats under vague or overbroad statutes, and the existence of certain criminal prosecutions,
are likewise invalid because by their very nature they restrain or
chill legitimate speech activities. The assumption that the chilling
effect will occur is made regardless of the prospects for success or
failure in the particular case. The key reason in both instances is
that the normal procedures-defense of a state criminal prosecution and the appellate route-have the immediate and permanently
destructive effect of restraint on the exercise of speech. The only
corrective relief is so distant and ephemeral that the delayed vindication of the first amendment rights is no real relief at all. The
delay alone is a denial of effective protection of speech activities.
Add the Dombrowski presumption that criminal prosecutions normally do not allow for correction of the evils and the "unarticulated assumption that state courts will not be as prone as federal
243 Professor Amsterdam notes, as must I, that "I am not making the
naive assumption that all federal district judges are appropriately sympathetic to the enforcement of all or any federal rights. . .. Institutions
must be designed in view of generalities; as a generality, I have no doubt
that the federal judges are more enlightened concerning, more tolerant
toward, and more courageous to protect, federal rights than are their state
counterparts." Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 837 n.186.
244 See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Emerson, The Doctrine
of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 648 (1955).
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courts to vindicate constitutional rights promptly and effectiveIY,"245 and it becomes apparent that there is a glaring need for
uniform and speedy relief. 246
It is submitted that the only way at present to achieve this uniform, speedy relief throughout the nation is to require federal
district courts to decide challenges made to the legitimacy of state
proceedings or statutes. Although a working relationship between
the state and federal courts is obviously desirable, it is not necessarily the pinnacle value.
Stated as an unqualified preference for state administration of federal law which takes its shape within a matrix of
state law regulation, the argument evidently proves too
much; for every congressionally created federal trial jurisdiction constitutes to some extent a subordination of that
value to the values of federal law enforcement by nationally responsible tribunals. And if it is true that constitutional restrictions on the state criminal process present a
particularly fertile field for valuable interaction of federal
and state law in the state courts, it is also true that they
present a particularly strong adversity of state and federal interests, and hence a particularly strong risk that
federal rights will suffer if left in state hands. 247
Another point which must be considered is that the issue is not
whether federal courts should have any jurisdiction to review the
legitimacy of state criminal proceedings, but whether the stage at
which the review occurs should be altered. "Not all intrusions
are equally abrasive."248 Normally, federal courts intrude only
after procedures within the state have been exhausted. "Speech"
therefore fights the same battle over and over again, and the
state is given a renewed opportunity in every case to correct a
given evil. Yet value decisions have been made in related areas of
federal jurisdiction-removal in civil rights cases, diversity and
federal question jurisdiction, and anticipatory habeas corpus249that the state process inherently has sufficient prejudice within it
to warrant a presumption that federal relief must be available at
an early stage in the process. Section 1983 created, and Dombrowski has finally recoguized, the presumption that the state process is inherently ill-equipped to handle the kinds of challenges to
state authority made in a way which will afford any meaningful
protection to speech activities. Arguably, intrusion by the lowest
federal court-more aware of local interests and pressures, and
closest to the problems-creates less conflict than intrusion by the
Supreme Court on appeal. I do not speak of "conflict" in the sense
245 Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (dissenting opinion).
See also Brewer, supra note 2, at 95; Boyer, supra note 2, at 85.
246 See Brewer, supra note 2, at 71, 94, 95; Boyer, supra note 2, at 51.
247 Amsterdam, supra note 66, at 836.
248 Id. at 835.
249 28 U.S.C. §§ 1443, 1331-32, 2241 (1964).
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that some of the local citizenry get any less excited about "federal
interference."250 I speak of "conflict" in terms of preserving as
much of the state process as possible. The intrusion comes at an
early stage in the process, rather than at the very end, and the
state saves a considerable investment in time, money, and prestige if it learns of its errors early. Intervention at this stage would
allow the state a meaningful opportunity to correct the evil; for
example, by obtaining a permissible limiting construction of the
vague statute in a state declaratory judgment proceeding; by finding another, constitutionally specific statute under which to
charge; by deciding not to pursue prosecution any further; by disciplining officials found to be acting in "bad faith;" and ultimately,
it is hoped, by providing affirmative protection to speech activities.
If the state then proceeded further, it would do so with the contours of its powers clearly defined and the importance of the federal interests firmly and freshly impressed upon it by the federal court. 251
Another reason for early consideration by a federal court lies in
the need for a fact-finding process as free as possible from bias,
prejudice, and confusion. With regard to a bad faith attack, for
example, the very evil under attack often is that the prosecution
was in some way motivated by strong local bias, prejudice, or
bigotry. In this circumstance, a legitimate presumption is created that the fact-finding process will have a better chance of
being correct and complete in the federal forum. The classic differences which make the federal courts, on the whole, less likely to
be responsive to local prejudices-lifetime tenure of judges and secure salaries-show their importance particularly in cases where
the court is called upon to protect those who have incurred the
wrath of local powers. Clean fact-finding is also crucial to a mean250 It is probably true that a federal district judge who, by various orders
restricting state activities, supports the speech activities of unpopular minorities or dissenters, will be subject to substantially more abuse than would
the Supreme Court if it issued the same order. This is due to many factors,
including the fact that the judge is a part of the local community. The
sense of "betrayal" felt by the community when he lends his support to
an unpopular cause will be greater than when similar support is furnished
by a distant, and quite impersonal Supreme Court. Also significant is the
fact that the decision is likely to be rendered while local passions over the
incidents or individuals involved are still aroused. For example, Judge
James E. Doyle, the sole federal judge for the Western District of Wisconsin was criticized when he issued a series of temporary restraining orders
against various punitive actions by the State of Wisconsin initiated against
the antiwar demonstrators who were the plaintiffs in Zwicker v. Boll, 270
F. Supp. 131 (W.D. Wis. 1967).
251 Dombrowski "will definitely have the effect of causing state prosecutors and trial courts to test the facts of cases raising basic constitutional
questions against controlling Supreme Court decisions, for the accuracy of
their efforts in this connection may be put to the test in the federal courts."
Brewer, supra note 2, at 105.
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ingful appellate review, since so many legal determinations turn
on the scope and nature of the fact-finding process.
Professor Amsterdam suggests that expansion of the civil rights
removal statute provides the best way to "clearly, cleanly and
completely"252 exclude these cases from the state court jurisdiction. He presents strong arguments which demonstrate that the
amount of friction created is far less when a matter is removed
completely than when touchy and sensitive factual issues must be
tried 'concerning the competency of the state court. 253
However, removal is not necessarily the best remedy when the
criminal proceeding itself is challenged. The "removal of friction"
between the systems, although important, should not be the paramount concern. It is more important to achieve the maximum protection possible for first amendment activities, even at the expense
of retaining a certain amount of friction. A criminal proceeding,
even in the federal courts, imposes burdens on the individual
and on speech activities, which warrant the existence of a procedure which relieves these burdens until it is determined that a
criminal proceeding is, indeed, legitimate. Removal will eliminate
certain problems of prejudice inherent in the state courts, and may
cleanse the fact-finding process, but it will not eliminate the serious
prejudice present in the criminal proceeding itself. Likewise, it
will not obviate the threat of prosecution for others. It initially
accepts the very determination-that a criminal proceeding may
constitutionally be begun-which is challenged as invalid. To
resolve the matter in a federal court, therefore, would relieve only
part of the chilling effect.
The ultimate consideration is that the availability of federal power
against state infringement of federally protected rights of free
speech and assembly must be as immediate and effective as is state
power to seize membership lists, destroy a demonstration, or arrest a speaker. The state courts, in theory, should exercise their
power to protect these federal interests. "[B] ut the battle is not
over theory. The battle is for the streets, and on the.streets conviction [or even arrest] now is worth a hundred times reversal
later."254 The Dombrowski remedy is essential to the realization of
immediate affirmative protection for speech activities. Hopefully,
the use of federal power now will help create state systems willing
to lend as much immediate power to protecting these activities as
they presently do to thwart them.
VI.

CLOSING NOTE

Subsequent to the preparation of this article, the United States
252 Amsterdam,

rd.
2fi4 rd. at 801.
253

supra note 66, at 835.
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Supreme Court decided Cameron v. Johnson. 255 Justice Brennan,
for the majority, held that the Mississippi Unlawful Picketing
statute was not void for vagueness or overbreadth, and that the
evidentiary hearing had not established a bad faith prosecution.
The decision confirms that neither abstention nor section 2283
prevent a consideration of the merits of the two Dombrowski challenges. As to the vagueness and overbreadth attack, declaratory
relief must issue if the statute's invalidity is established. As to
the bad faith attack, the Court denied equitable relief after considering the issue on its merits. It did not reach the issue of
whether section 2283 would bar the issuance of an injunction otherwise thought appropriate. Both the majority and Justices Fortas
and Douglas, in dissent, expressly reserve decision on this point.256
The burden which the Court intimates must be met to justify
equitable relief against prosecutorial abuse is an extremely unrealistic and onerous one. 257 This test appears to allow state officials to harass the exercise of protected expression so long as
they have an expectation of obtaining conviction. Since the same
community attitudes which promote or condone the police action
are likely to support the locally elected prosecutor and judge, or
locally selected jury, the expectation of conviction should not be
the crucial factor. It was hoped, rather, that the Supreme Court
would accept the more realistic philosophy of the fifth circuit,
which considers "guilt" as only one of many relevant factors.258
Cameron seems to allow a readily accessible remedy, in the form
of a suit for declaratory judgment, to attack the use of vague or
overbroad statutes. When the harrassment of protected expression
is pursued under a facially valid statute, however, Cameron's language seems to impose an almost overwhelming evidentiary burden. Whether the test announced in Cameron is as stringent as it
appears must await further litigation.

255 36 U.S.L.W. 4319 (April 22, 1968).
Id. at 4320 n.3; Id. at 4324 n.5.
Id. at 4322.
See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 744 (1967): "Police
may arrest guilty people for reasons other than their guilt-for example
for the reason that they are Negroes who want to register and vote."
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